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Quite Imposing Plus 4 Upgrade info
Quite Imposing Plus 4.0 was released on 17 August 2015. As well as support for
there are many new features.
What's in the Quite Imposing Plus 4 upgrade?
Quite Imposing Plus 4 is the latest version of the industry?s favourite imposition plug-in for Adobe Acrobat,
fully compatible with the new Acrobat DC/XI/X/9. We have listened to our customers and their wish lists, and added features that will let you do more, and work quicker. Upgrading should be pain free, as you can run old and new plug-ins side by side, and Quite Imposing Plus 4 imports all your settings from the old software.
Stick on PDF pages & new function. Easily add or remove pages as graphics once or many times.
Add one, some or all pages from another PDF on top of current
Scale by percentage or to fit space, with or without preserving aspect ratio
Free rotate
Preview outline shows where page will be placed
Choose from recently used files
Undo and peel off available
Quick file info for page count and sizes
Stick on text and numbers & set embedded fonts or colours, allow rotation, show preview of position.
Use most fonts (European Latin1 only), embed
Preview box shows where text will be added to current page
Rotate text by 0/90/180/270
Set a colour in RGB or CMYK
Undo available, dialog stays on screen so you can undo if needed
Redesigned dialog so you can open/close the options you need
Insert pages and files & insert pages or files repeatedly at intervals
Insert blank pages repeatedly (insert at intervals).
Insert file repeatedly, or insert file at intervals. Can be used to merge files, add standard backs, etc.
Choose from recently used files
Quick file info for page count and sizes
Undo available (from Control Panel)
Manual imposition & repeat layout for the rest of the document, so you only have to lay out one or two sheets. Smart crop marks.
Continue to more sheets (layout one or more sheets, repeat layout to use up entire input and make as many new sheets as needed)
Smart crop marks, automatically adjusted if they overlap pages
Double sided option, automatically mirror position on back of sheet to place front,back,front,back...
Shift+click on Pick Source to quickly pick the current page
Shift+click on Choose target to quickly use the same options as last time for target (new or existing document)
Redesigned dialog so you can open/close the options you need
Adjust page sizes & scale by percentage, get page size report, set pages the same size.
Quickly scale pages by a percentage, rather than a target page size
Get page size report on current document
Set pages all the same size without knowing size in advance (Advanced option)
Verify all pages are the same size
Resize only pages that are already close to the target size
Shuffle pages for imposition & specify ra very large documents will shuffle or reverse much faster in many cases
Use .. (two dots) in a rule for a range e.g. 1..100 200..101
Significant speed up in many cases for large numbers of pages
Much larger shuffle rules can be used (allowing automatic generation)
Window can be resized to make it easier to work with larger rules
Tile pages & choose width and height
Option to choose the widths and heights of each tile (all the same or all different) instead of the number of rows and columns. Any overlap is shared over the tiles.
Page tools & free rotate
Rotate pages by any angle, not just 90/180/270 degrees
Use very small angles for micro-adjustment for alignment issues & you can leave page size unchanged in this case
Automation sequences & new manager to simplify dealing with large numbers of sequences: rename, duplicate etc., backup, restore, collect, report and fix missing files.
Remember last and play back now can use automation sequences with a streamlined interface
New Sequence Manager with many productivity gains:
Rename or duplicate sequences
Use drag and drop to create and arrange sequences
Move or copy sequences to other categories
Generate reports on sequences for ease of reference
Rename, delete or duplicate whole categories
Manage files used in sequences (e.g backgrounds)
View or save report on files used
Change or locate missing files and directories
Collect files together for moving to another system, or to clean up
Manage files used in backgrounds too
Backup and restore sequences
Restore from collect, to set up new system
Automatic backups at intervals to go back before changes
Backup and restore background and page size definitions too
Control panel & redesigned, with power user shortcuts
New streamlined look
Undo option for selected commands including all "stick on" commands
Shift+click to quickly repeat command with the last options used
"Peel off" button replaces the three separate buttons before, and also adds support for removing the result of Stick On PDF Pages. (Also
replaces the separate selections in the menu).
And many more new features!
Undo feature for selected commands
As well as manual imposition, you can undo stick on text and numbers, stick on PDF pages, stick on masking tape and insert pages.
Taken from Trim & shift, because it wasn't obvious where it was (still available in Trim & shift).
Stick on masking tape
Set a colour in RGB or CMYK
Undo (remove last applied masking tape)
Trim and shift
Advanced option to keep bleed margins rather than always remove bleed
Remember last / playback
Now provide a simple interface to automation sequences
Performance enhancements
Major speed up for reordering files with many pages including Shuffle Pages, Reverse Pages, Shuffle Even/Odd.
Open/close triangles
Some dialogs have been redesigned with triangles to click to open/close groups of options
Hold down shift to open/close all groups at once.
PDF/X support
Previously the "preserve PDF/X" option stopped adding text to PDF/X files because fonts were not embedded. Now you can add text, provided you choose an embedded font.
Developer/XML creator
Insert pages and background definition now supports Path key as alternative to DIPath.
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3秒自动关闭窗口From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA; : ?????? ???? ????? ??????,  barnāme jāme‘ eqdām moshtarak?, : ????? BARJAM), known commonly as the Iran deal or Iran nuclear deal, is an international agreement on the
reached in
on 14 July 2015 between , the
(the five —, , , , —plus ), and the .
Formal negotiations toward the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear program began with the adoption of the , an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. For the next twenty months, Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations, and in April 2015 agreed on an
for the final agreement and in July 2015, Iran and the P5+1 agreed on the plan.
Under the agreement, Iran agreed to eliminate its stockpile of medium-, cut its stockpile of low-enriched uranium by 98%, and reduce by about two-thirds the number of its
for 13 years. For the next 15 years, Iran will only enrich uranium up to 3.67%. Iran also agreed not to build any new
for the same period of time. Uranium-enrichment activities will be limited to a single facility using first-generation centrifuges for 10 years. Other facilities will be converted to avoid
risks. To monitor and verify Iran's compliance with the agreement, the
(IAEA) will have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities. The agreement provides that in return for verifiably abiding by its commitments, Iran will receive relief from U.S., European Union, and
nuclear-related economic .
to cause a . The most commonly used materials have been
(U-235) and
(P-239). Both
(U-233) and
have also been used. The amount of uranium or plutonium needed depends on the sophistication of the design, with a simple design requiring approximately 15 kg of uranium or 6 kg of plutonium and a sophisticated design requiring as little as 9 kg of uranium or 2 kg of plutonium. Plutonium is almost nonexistent in nature, and natural uranium is about 99.3%
(U-238) and 0.7% U-235. Therefore, to make a weapon, either uranium must be , or plutonium must be produced. Uranium enrichment is also frequently necessary for . For this reason, uranium enrichment is a , a technology which "can be used both for civilian and for military purposes". Key strategies to prevent
include limiting the number of operating uranium enrichment plants and controlling the export of
Iranian development of
began in the 1970s, when the U.S.
program began providing assistance to Iran, which was then led by the . Iran signed the
(NPT) in 1968 as a non-nuclear weapons state and ratified the NPT in 1970.
In 1979, the
took place, and Iran's nuclear program, which had developed some baseline capacity, fell to disarray as "much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution." Ayatollah
was initially opposed t and Iran engaged in a
from 1980 to 1988.
Starting in the later 1980s, Iran restarted its nuclear program, with assistance from Pakistan (which entered into a bilateral agreement with Iran in 1992), China (which did the same in 1990), and Russia (which did the same in 1992 and 1995), and from the
network. Iran "began pursuing an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle capability by developing a uranium mining infrastructure and experimenting with uranium conversion and enrichment." According to the nonpartisan , "U.S. intelligence agencies have long suspected Iran of using its civilian nuclear program as a cover for clandestine weapons development." Iran, in contrast, "has always insisted that its nuclear work is peaceful".
In August 2002, the Paris-based , an Iranian dissident group, publicly revealed the existence of two undeclared nuclear facilities, the
heavy-water production facility and the
enrichment facility. In February 2003, Iranian President
acknowledged the existence of the facilities and asserted that Iran had undertaken "small-scale enrichment experiments" to produce low-enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. In late February,
(IAEA) inspectors visited Natanz. In May 2003, Iran allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the Kalaye Electric Company, but refused to allow them to take samples, and an IAEA report the following month concluded that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under the previous agreement.
In June 2003, Iran—faced with the prospect of being referred to the —entered into diplomatic negotiations with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU 3). The United States refused to be involved in these negotiations. In October 2003, the Tehran Declaration was reached between Iran and the EU 3; under this declaration Iran agreed to cooperate fully with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend all uranium enrichment. In September and October 2003, the IAEA conducted several facility inspections. This was followed by the Paris Agreement in November 2004, in which Iran agreed to temporarily suspend enrichment and conversion activities, "including the manufacture, installation, testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic solution".
In August 2005, , a hard-liner, was elected . He accused Iranian negotiators who had negotiated the Paris Accords of treason. Over the next two months, the EU 3 agreement fell apart as talks over the EU 3's proposed Long Term A the Iranian government "felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement". Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume uranium conversion at .
In February 2006, Iran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz, prompting the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. After the vote, Iran announced it would resume enrichment of uranium. In April 2006, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had nuclear technology, but stated that it was purely for power generation and not for producing weapons. In June 2006, the EU 3 joined China, Russia, and the United States, to form the P5+1. The following month, July 2006, the UN Security Council passed its first resolution demanding Iran stop uranium enrichment and processing. Altogether, from 2006 to 2010, the UN Security Council subsequently adopted six resolutions concerning Iran's nuclear program: 1696 (July 2006), 1737 (December 2006), 1747 (March 2007), 1803 (March 2008), 1835 (September 2008), and 1929 (June 2010). The legal authority for the IAEA Board of Governors referral and the Security Council resolutions was derived from the IAEA Statute and the . The resolutions demanded that Iran cease enrichment activities and imposed sanctions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of nuclear and missile technology to the country and freezes on the assets of certain Iranian individuals and entities, in order to pressure the country. However, in Resolution 1803 and elsewhere the Security Council also acknowledged Iran's rights under Article IV of the NPT, which provides for "the inalienable right ... to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes".
In July 2006, Iran opened the Arak heavy water production plant, which led to one of the Security Council resolutions. In September 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama, revealed the existence of an underground enrichment facility in Fordow, near
saying, "Iran's decision to build yet another nuclear facility without notifying the IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at the center of the non-proliferation regime." Israel threatened to take military action against Iran.
In a February 2007 interview with the , IAEA director general
said that military action against Iran "would be catastrophic, counterproductive" and called for negotiations between the international community and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program. ElBaradei specifically proposed a "double, simultaneous suspension, a time out" as "a confidence-building measure", under which the international sanctions would be suspended and Iran would suspend enrichment. ElBaradei also said, "if I look at it from a weapons perspective there are much more important issues to me than the suspension of [enrichment]," naming his top priorities as preventing Iran from "go[ing] to industrial capacity until the issues are settled"; building confidence, with "full inspection" involving Iran and "at all costs" preventing Iran from "moving out of the [treaty-based non-proliferation] system".
A November 2007 U.S.
assessed that Iran "halted its nuclear weapons program" in 2003; that estimate and subsequent U.S. Intelligence Community statements also assessed that the Iranian government at the time had was "keeping open the 'option' to develop nuclear weapons" in the future. A July 2015
report said, "statements from the U.S. intelligence community indicate that Iran has the technological and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but the U.S. government assesses that Tehran has not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building a nuclear weapon."
In March 2013, the United States began a series of secret bilateral talks with Iranian officials in , led by
on the American side and Ali Asghar Khaji on the Iranian side. In June 2013,
was elected president of Iran. Rouhani has been described as "more moderate, pragmatic and willing to negotiate than Ahmadinejad". However, in a 2006 nuclear negotiation with European powers, Rouhani said that Iran had used the negotiations to dupe the Europeans, saying that during the negotiations, Iran managed to master the conversion of uranium
at Isfahan. The conversion of yellowcake is an important step in the nuclear fuel process. In August 2013, three days after his inauguration, Rouhani called for a resumption of serious negotiations with the P5+1 on the Iranian nuclear program. In September 2013, Obama and Rouhani had a telephone conversation, the first high-level contact between U.S. and Iranian leaders since 1979, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry had a meeting with Iranian foreign minister , signaling that the two countries had an opening to cooperation.
After several rounds of negotiations, on 24 November 2013, the , an interim agreement on the Iranian nuclear program, was signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in , Switzerland. It consisted of a short-term freeze of portions of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for decreased economic sanctions on Iran, as the countries work towards a long-term agreement. The IAEA began "more intrusive and frequent inspections" under this interim agreement. The agreement was formally activated on 20 January 2014. On that day, the IAEA issued a report stating that Iran was adhering to the terms of the interim agreement, including stopping enrichment of uranium to 20 percent, beginning the dilution process (to reduce half of the stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to 3.5 percent), and halting work on the Arak heavy-water reactor.
A major focus on the negotiations was limitations on : the
reactor and production plant (which was under construction, but never became operational, as Iran agreed as part of the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action (interim agreement) not to commission or fuel the reactor); the G the
uranium- the
uran and the
military research and development complex.
The agreement between the P5+1+EU and Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is the culmination of 20 months of "arduous" negotiations.
The agreement followed the
(JPA), an interim agreement between the P5+1 powers and Iran that was agreed to on 24 November 2013 at . The Geneva agreement was an interim deal, in which Iran agreed to roll back parts of its nuclear program in exchange for relief from . This went into effect on 20 January 2014. The parties agreed to extend their talks with a first extension deadline on 24 November 2014 and a second extension deadline set to 1 July 2015.
was reached on 2 April 2015. Under this framework Iran agreed tentatively to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, all of which would last for at least a decade and some longer, and to submit to an increased intensity of
under a framework deal. These details were to be negotiated by the end of June 2015. The negotiations toward a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action were extended several times until the final agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was finally reached on 14 July 2015. The JCPOA is based on the framework agreement from three months earlier.
Subsequently the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 continued. In April 2014, a
deal was reached at . Intense marathon negotiations then continued, with the last session in
lasting for seventeen days. At several points, negotiations appeared to be at risk of breaking down, but negotiators managed to come to agreement. As the negotiators neared a deal, U.S. Secretary of State
directly asked Iranian Foreign Minister
to confirm that he was "authorized to actually make a deal, not just by the [Iranian] president, but by the supreme leader?" Zarif gave assurances that he was.
Ultimately, on 14 July 2015, all parties agreed to a landmark comprehensive nuclear agreement. At the time of the announcement, shortly before 11:00 GMT, the agreement was released to the public.
The final agreement's complexity shows the impact of a public letter written by a bipartisan group of 19 U.S. diplomats, experts, and others in June 2015, written when negotiations were still going on. That letter outlined concerns about the several provisions in the then-unfinished agreement and called for a number of improvements to strengthen the prospective agreement and win their support for it. After the final agreement was reached, one of the signatories, Robert J. Einhorn, a former U.S. Department of State official now at the , said of the agreement: "Analysts will be pleasantly surprised. The more things are agreed to, the less opportunity there is for implementation difficulties later on."
The final agreement is based upon (and buttresses) "the rules-based nonproliferation regime created by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and including especially the
signatures of lead negotiators on the cover page of the JCPOA document. The
handwriting on top left side is a homage by
to his counterparts' efforts in the negotiations: "[I am] Sincere to
[Araghchi] and
[Takht-Ravanchi]."
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) runs to 109 pages, including five annexes. Major provisions of the final accord include the following:
JCPOA summary of enrichment-related provisions
Capability
Before JCPOA
After JCPOA
(for 10-year period)
After 15 years
First-generation
centrifuges installed
capped at 6,104
Unconstrained
Advanced centrifuges installed
Unconstrained
Centrifuge R&D
Unconstrained
Constrained
Unconstrained
Stockpile of
low-enriched uranium
7,154 kg
300 kg
Unconstrained
Stockpile of
medium-enriched uranium
196 kg
Unconstrained
Iran's current stockpile of low-enriched uranium will be reduced by 98 percent, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg. This reduction will be maintained for fifteen years. For the same fifteen-year period, Iran will be limited to enriching uranium to 3.67%, a percentage sufficient for civilian
and research, but not for building a . However, the number of centrifuges is sufficient for a nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power. This is a "major decline" in Iran's previ prior to watering down its stockpile pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action interim agreement, Iran had enriched uranium to near 20% (medium-enriched uranium). These enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold in return for natural uranium, and the uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67%. The implementation of the commercial contracts will be facilitated by P5+1. After fifteen years, all physical limits on enrichment will be removed, including limits on the type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, and where Iran may have enrichment facilities. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options".
For ten years, Iran will place over two-thirds of its
in storage, from its current stockpile of 19,000 centrifuges (of which 10,000 were operational) to no more than 6,104 operational centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium, with the enrichment capacity being limited to the Natanz plant. The centrifuges there must be IR-1 centrifuges, the first-generation centrifuge type which is Iran's oldest Iran will give up its advanced IR-2M centrifuges in this period. The non-operating centrifuges will be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but may be used to replace failed centrifuges. Iran will not build any new uranium-enrichment facilities for fifteen years.
Iran may continue
work on enrichment, but that work will take place only at the Natanz facility and include certain limitations for the first eight years. This is intended to keep the country to a breakout time of one year.
Iran, with cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), will modernise and rebuild the
based on an agreed design to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, but in such a way to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce
plutonium. The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The P5+1 parties will support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the Arak complex. All
will be sent out of the country. All excess
which is beyond Iran's needs for the redesigned reactor will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices. In exchange, Iran received 130 tons of uranium in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to receive 130 tons in 2017. For 15 years, Iran will not engage in, or research on, . Iran will also not build any additional
reactors or accumulate heavy water for fifteen years.
will stop enriching uranium and researching uranium enrichment for at the facility will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years, Fordow will maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing of Fordow. "Two of those six cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification," for stable
production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. "The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle." Iran will not be permitted to have any
in Fordow.
Iran will implement an
agreement which will continue in perpetuity for as long as Iran remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The signing of the Additional Protocol represents a continuation of the monitoring and verification provisions "long after the comprehensive agreement between the P5+1 and Iran is implemented".
A comprehensive inspections regime will be implemented in order to monitor and confirm that Iran is complying with its obligations and is not diverting any fissile material.
The IAEA will have multilayered oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of ". For declared nuclear sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA will have "round-the-clock access" to nuclear facilities and will be entitled to maintain continuous monitoring (including via
equipment) at such sites. The agreement authorizes the IAEA to make use of sophisticated monitoring technology, such as
seals on equipment that can electronically send information to the IAEA;
satellite imagery to detect covert sites, "environmental sensors that can detect minute signs of nuclear particles"; tamper-resistant, radiation-resistant cameras. Other tools include computerized accounting programs to gather information and detect anomalies, and
sets on Iranian imports, to monitor .
The number of IAEA inspectors assigned to Iran will triple, from 50 to 150 inspectors.
If IAEA inspectors have concerns that Iran is developing nuclear capabilities at any non-declared sites, they may request access "to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with" the agreement, informing Iran of the basis for their concerns. The inspectors would only come from countries with which Iran has diplomatic relations. Iran may admit the inspectors to such site or propose alternatives to inspection that might satisfy the IAEA's concerns. If such an agreement cannot be reached, a process running to a maximum of 24 days is triggered. Under this process, Iran and the IAEA have 14 days to resolve disagreements among themselves. If they fail to, the Joint Commission (including all eight parties) would have one week in which to consider the intelligence which initiated the IAEA request. A majority of the Commission (at least five of the eight members) could then inform Iran of the action that it would be required to take within three more days. The majority rule provision "means the United States and its European allies—Britain, France, Germany and the EU—could insist on access or any other steps and that Iran, Russia or China could not veto them". If Iran did not comply with the decision within three days, sanctions would be automatically reimposed under the snapback provision (see below).
As a result of the above, the "breakout time"—the time in which it would be possible for Iran to make enough material for a single nuclear weapon—will increase from two to three months to one year, according to U.S. officials and U.S. intelligence. An August 2015 report published by a group of experts at 's
concurs in these estimates, writing that under the JCPOA, "over the next decade would be extended to roughly a year, from the current estimated breakout time of 2 to 3 months". The
also accepts these estimates. By contrast, Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, disputed the one-year assessment, arguing that under the agreement, Iran's breakout time "would be only about three months, not much longer than it is today".
The longer breakout time would be in place fo after that point, the breakout time would gradually decrease. By the fifteenth year, U.S. officials state that the breakout time would return to the pre-JCPOA status quo of a few months. The Belfer Center report states: "Some contributors to this report believe that breakout time by year 15 could be comparable to what it is today—a few months—while others believe it could be reduced to a few weeks."
reported that exemptions were granted to Iran prior to 16 January 2016. The reported purpose of the exemptions was so that sanctions relief and other benefits could start by that date, instead of Iran being in violation. The exemptions included: (a) Iran able to exceed the 300 Kg of 3.5% LEU li (b) Iran able to exceed the zero Kg of 20% LEU li (c) Iran to keep operating 19 "hot cells" that exceed the size li (d) Iran to maintain control of 50 tonnes of heavy water that exceed the 130 tonne limit in the agreement by storing the excess at an Iran-controlled facility in Oman. In December 2016, the IAEA published decisions of the Joint Commission that spell out these clarifications of the JCPOA.
The following provisions regarding sanctions are written into the JCPOA:
Following the issuance of a IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures, the UN
and some EU sanctions will terminate and some will be suspended. Once sanctions are lifted, Iran will recover approximately
( estimate) frozen in overseas banks.
Eight years into the agreement, EU sanctions against a number of Iranian companies, individuals and institutions (such as the ) will be lifted.
The United States will "cease" application of its nuclear-related secondary sanctions by presidential action or . Secondary sanctions are those that sanction other countries for doing business with Iran. Primary U.S. sanctions, which prohibit U.S. firms from conducting commercial transactions with few exceptions, are not altered by the JCPOA.
This step is not tied to any specific date, but is expected to occur "roughly in the first half of 2016".
Sanctions relating to
technologies would re similar sanctions on
sales to Iran would remain for five years.
However, all U.S. sanctions against Iran related to alleged human rights abuses, missiles, and support for terrorism are not affected by the agreement and will remain in place. U.S. sanctions are viewed as more stringent, since many have
(i.e., they apply worldwide). EU sanctions, by contrast, apply only in Europe.
No new UN or EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures will be imposed.
If Iran violates the agreement, any of the P5+1 can invoke a "snap back" provision, under which the sanctions "snap back" into place (i.e., are reimplemented).
Specifically, the JCPOA establishes the following
process: if a party to the JCPOA has reason to believe that another party is not upholding its commitments under the agreement, then the complaining party may refer its complaint to the Joint Commission, a body created under the JCPOA to monitor implementation. If a complaint made by a non-Iran party is not resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining party within thirty-five days of referral, then that party could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under the JCPOA, notify the
that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance, or both. The Security Council would then have thirty days to adopt a resolution to continue the lifting of sanctions. If such a resolution is not adopted within those thirty days, then the sanctions of all of the pre-JCPOA nuclear-related UN Security Council resolutions would automatically be re-imposed. Iran has stated that in such a case, it would cease performing its nuclear obligations under the deal. The effect of this rule is that any
(United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia and France) can veto any ongoing sanctions relief, but no member can veto the re-imposition of sanctions.
Snapback sanctions "would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions".
Ankit Panda of
states that this will make impossible any scenario where Iran is non-compliant with the JCPOA yet escapes re-imposition of sanctions. Mark Dubowitz of the
(which opposes the agreement) argues, however, that because the JCPOA provides that Iran could treat reinstatement of sanctions (in part or entirely) as grounds for leaving the agreement, the United States would be reluctant to impose a "snapback" for smaller violations: "The only thing you'll take to the Security Council are massive Iranian violations, because you're certainly not going to risk the Iranians walking away from the deal and engaging in nuclear escalation over smaller violations."
According to several commentators, JCPOA is the first of its kind in the annals of
and is in many aspects unique.
The 159-page JCPOA document and its five appendices, is the most spacious text of a multinational treaty since . Throughout the history of international law, this is the first and only time that a country subject to
– has managed to end its case and stop being subject to this chapter through . All other cases have ended through either ,
or full implementation of the Security Council's decisions by the country.
This is the first time that the
has recognized the
program of a
–– and backs an agreement (JCPOA) signed by several countries within the framework of a resolution (). For the first time in the history of the , a country –– was able to abolish 6 UN resolutions against it –, , , , , – without even one day of implementating them.
was also lifted for the first time.
In the 47-year history of the
(NPT), no country other than Iran has ever voluntarily agreed to put extraordinary restrictions on its nuclear activities.
During the final negotiations,
stayed in Vienna for 17 days, making him the top American official devoting time to a single international negotiation in more than four decades.
broke the record of an
being far from home with 18-days stay in Vienna, and set the record of 106 days of negotiations in 687 days, a number higher than any other
in 12 years. The negotiations became the longest continuous negotiations with the presence of all foreign ministers of the .
Pictured here, Iranian foreign affairs minister and U.S. secretary of state shaking hands at the end of negotiations on 14 July 2015, Vienna. They shook hands on 26 September 2013 in the
for the first time.
The negotiations included 'rare events' in
not only since the , but also in the history of the bilateral relations. The U.S. Secretary of State and Iranian Foreign Minister met on 18 different dates –sometimes multiple occasions a day– and in 11 different cities, unprecedented since the beginning of the relations. On 27 April 2015,
visited the official residence of the
–which counts as Iranian soil– to meet his counterpart. The encounter was the first of its kind since the . On the sidelines of the ,
shook hands with the Iranian foreign minister , marking the first such event in history. The event was also noted in form of , as a
shook hands with a . Obama is reported to have said in the meeting: "Too much effort has been put into the JCPOA and we all should be diligent to implement it."
There was a significant worldwide response following the announcem more than 90 countries endorsed the agreement, as did many international organizations.
 China
said, "the most important achievement of the comprehensive agreement is that the international nuclear non-proliferation system is safeguarded. It can be said that China had played a unique and constructive role and thus is highly praised and affirmed by all parties. In the next step, there are still many matters to be attended to concerning the implementation of the agreement. China will continuously make new contribution [sic] to this end with a responsible attitude."
 European Union
, who acted as coordinator for the powers, said it could "open the way to a new chapter in
and show that diplomacy, coordination, cooperation can overcome decades of tensions and confrontations" and that it is "a sign of hope for the entire world".
, , congratulated the negotiating parties and said: "If fully implemented, the agreement could be a turning point in relations between Iran and the international community, paving the way to new avenues of cooperation between the EU and Iran. Geopolitically, it has the potential to be a game changer."
 France
praised the deal and called upon Iran to "show that it is ready to help us end" the . French Foreign Minister
that the pact was a "robust agreement" that would last at least a decade. Both Hollande and Fabius pledged that France would be "extremely vigilant" in the implementation of the agreement.
Fabius visited Iran on 29 July, telling reporters in Tehran, "this deal allows the
to develop and allows us to renew cooperation." His visit was controversial in Iran and met with public anger for several reasons.
 Germany
said that the agreement was "an important success" of international diplomacy.
Vice Chancellor and Economy Minister
said that the agreement was a "historic breakthrough". In mid-July 2015, Gabriel, along with a delegation of German industry and science representatives, completed a three-day visit to Iran focused on bolstering German-Iranian trade. Gabriel said there was "great interest on the part of German industry in normalizing and strengthening economic relations with Iran".
 Iran
said the final agreement proved that "constructive engagement works" and presented the deal as a step on the road towards a wider goal of international cooperation: "With this unnecessary crisis resolved, new horizons emerge with a focus on shared challenges."
called it an "historic moment" and said: "Today could have been the end of hope on this issue, but now we are starting a new chapter of hope. Let's build on that."
In a 21 July speech to the Iranian Parliament, Zarif said that the agreement was a defeat for Israel, saying, "Never before was the Zionist regime so isolated, even among her own allies." On 12 August, after a meeting with
leader , Zarif said that the agreement "created a historic opportunity to [sic] for regional cooperation to fight extremism and face threats posed by the Zionist entity".
Many Iranian families and youth celebrated at
Square and elsewhere on the streets of Tehran on the evening of the agreement's announcements. Some held signs calling for the release of Iranian opposition leaders
from house arrest. Other ordinary Iranians cheered the announcement on social media.
On 16 July 2015, two days after the agreement was signed, , Ayatollah , made his first public comments on the final agreement in a letter to President Hassan Rouhani posted on Khamenei's website. Khamenei wrote, "bringing the negotiations to a conclusion was a milestone" but, "the prepared text, however, needs careful scrutiny". Iranian hard-liners took the letter as a signal of openness to criticize the deal. In a speech in Tehran marking the end of Ramadan made two days later, Khamenei said, "Our policies toward the arrogant government of the United States will not be changed at all," adding, "the Americans say they stopped Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon ... They know it's not true. We had
under Islamic law. It had nothing to do with the nuclear talks." However, Khamenei also praised the negotiators who arranged the deal, which was taken as a symbol that he would not seek to block the deal in the
or the . Khamenei also expressed support for the agreement, saying: "After 12 years of struggling with the Islamic republic, the result is that they [the P5+1 nations] have to bear the turning of thousands of centrifuges in the country." Khamenei is believed to have approved the negotiations and the agreement, giving Rouhani crucial political cover to do so.
The New York Times reported, "Iran's influential hard-liners, who have criticized Mr. Rouhani in much the same way that President Obama has been denounced by Republicans in the United States, signaled their intent to undercut the agreement," which they believe to be too favorable to the West. Foad Izadi, a professor at the , complained that of the 19 Iranian "major red lines" identified by the supreme leader during negotiations, "18 and a half have been crossed." Conservative lawmaker
said "celebrating too early can send a bad signal to the enemy."
Iran's official
stressed that under the agreement "world powers have recognized Iran's peaceful nuclear program and are to respect the nuclear rights of (Iran) within international conventions." The IRNA report also said, "The policy on preventing enrichment uranium is now failed" and stressed, "no Iranian nuclear facilities or centrifuges will be dismantled."
 Russian Federation
said in a statement: "We are certain that the world heaved a sigh of relief today."
stated the accord "will favorably affect the general situation in the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf".
 United Kingdom
Prime Minister
applauded the agreement, saying that it would help "make our world a safer place" and that Iran now had a "real opportunity" to benefit economically.
criticized the Israeli government's position on the JCPOA, saying in the , "no agreement with Iran would have been enough for Netanyahu" and "Israel prefers a permanent state of standoff" with Iran. At a joint press conference the next day in Jerusalem, Hammond and Netanyahu "sparred publicly" over the agreement, "veering off prepared comments ... in an awkward back-and-forth that extended what is usually a standard, brief public appearance with visiting officials into a spirited debate".
 United States
addressed the nation in a 7 a.m. televised address from the , with Vice President
at his side. Obama stated that the agreement "meets every single one of the bottom lines we established when we achieved a framework earlier this spring. Every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off. And the inspection and transparency regime necessary to verify that objective will be put in place." The president emphasized that the agreement is "not built on trust—it is built on verification". Obama vowed to veto any congressional action that would block the agreement's implementation, saying: "I am confident that this deal will meet the national security needs of the United States and our allies, so I will veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation of this deal. We do not have to accept an inevitable spiral into conflict, and we certainly shouldn't seek it." Obama stated: "I welcome scrutiny of the details of this agreement" and added, "This is not the time for politics or posturing. Tough talk from Washington does not solve problems. Hard-nosed diplomacy, leadership that has united the world's major powers, offers a more effective way to verify that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapon."
At a press briefing in Vienna, Secretary of State
said that the agreement was "a measureable step away from the prospect of nuclear proliferation" and "the specter of conflict" and "there can be no question that this agreement will provide a stronger, more comprehensive, and more lasting means of limiting Iran's nuclear program than any realistic alternative." Kerry also stated, "The deal we have reached ... gives us the greatest assurance that we have had that Iran will not pursue a weapon covertly." Addressing critics of the agreement, Kerry stated, "those who spend a lot of time suggesting that something could be better have an obligation to provide an alternative that, in fact, works" and "sanctioning Iran until it capitulates makes for a powerful talking point and a pretty good political speech, but it's not achievable outside a world of fantasy." Kerry also stated, "we are under no illusions that the hard work is over. No one is standing here today to say that the path ahead is easy or automatic. We move now to a new phase – a phase that is equally critical and may prove to be just as difficult – and that is implementation."
lined up against the deal. The
uniforml for example,
called the agreement "dangerous, deeply flawed, and short sighted" while
asserted that the deal was a "death sentence for the state of Israel". Former Obama advisor
tweeted, "none of these GOP contenders would end this Iran Deal if they got to the White House," and that it would "massively damage US in the world".
welcomed the deal. Former Secretary of State
called the agreement an "important step that puts the lid on Iran's nuclear programs"; Senator
called it "a victory for diplomacy over saber-rattling" that "could keep the United States from being drawn into another never-ending war in the Middle East".
, a Republican, called the JCPOA a "bad deal".
, a Democrat, said "I've closely examined this document. And it will have my strong support." Pelosi said that the agreement was "the product of years of tough, bold, clear-eyed leadership on the part of President Obama" and called it "a strong, effective option, for keeping the peace and stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction".
, a Republican, opposed the agreement, saying "The comprehensive nuclear agreement announced today appears to further the flawed elements of April's interim agreement because the Obama Administration approached these talks from a flawed perspective: reaching the best deal acceptable to Iran, rather than actually advancing our national goal of ending Iran's nuclear program."
, a Democrat, issued a brief statement on 14 July saying that the agreement was the result of years of hard work and, "now it is incumbent on Congress to review this agreement with the thoughtful, level-headed process an agreement of this magnitude deserves." On 23 August, Reid endorsed the agreement, saying that the agreement "is the best path to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon" and that he would "do everything in my power to ensure that it stands".
Chairman , a Republican, pledged to hold hearings on the deal during the sixty-day congressional review period and said that he is "totally opposed to" the agreement.
chairman , another Republican, also opposed the deal, saying that he believed that the West had conceded too much.
editorial board wrote that the agreement "is potentially one of the most consequential accords in recent diplomatic history, with the ability not just to keep Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon but also to reshape Middle East politics". They wrote: "It would be irresponsible to squander this chance to rein in Iran's nuclear program."
 Holy See
The Vatican applauded the deal, saying in a statement: "The agreement on the Iranian nuclear program is viewed in a positive light by the ."
 Israel
Prime Minister
said: "Israel is not bound by this deal with Iran, because Iran continues to seek our destruction, we will always defend ourselves." Netanyahu called the deal a "capitulation" and "a bad mistake of historic proportions". Deputy Foreign Minister
called the deal an "historic surrender" and said that Israel would "act with all means to try and stop the agreement being ratified"—indicating that it would try to use its influence to block the agreement in the , , leader of the
party (which is a member of the ), said: "The history books have been rewritten again today, and this period will be deemed particularly grave and dangerous."
Most of Israel's other political figures were similarly critical of the agreement. Netanyahu's main political opponent,
opposed the deal, stating that it "will unleash a lion from the cage" and make Iran "a nuclear-threshold state in a decade or so"; another Zionist Union member of the , , called the JCPOA a "dangerous, damaging agreement" , head of the opposition
party, called the agreement "Israel's biggest foreign policy failure since the establishment of the state". At the same time, many of these figures also criticized Netanyahu's diplomatic campaign against the plan, calling it ineffectual and counter-productive. Yachimovich said that Netanyahu should "immediately cease and desist from confronting the Americans". Lapid called on the prime minister to resign, stating: "I also am not thrilled by Obama's polices. But Netanyahu crossed a line that caused the White House to stop listening to Israel. In the last year we weren't even in the arena, we had no representative in Vienna, our intelligence cooperation was harmed, and the door to the White House was closed to us."
The head of the opposition
party, , described the agreement as a "surrender to terror".
, head of the opposition
party, voiced cautious support for the JCPOA, writing, "The agreement is not perfect, it does not turn Iran into lovers of Israel all of the sudden, but it does aim to prevent Iran from obtaining a bomb, regulate the international mechanisms to monitoring it and allows the international community to act if the agreement is violated."
MKs welcomed the agreement.
, former head of the Israeli internal security service
and former commander of the , said that the agreement was "the best option" for Israel, saying, "When negotiations began, Iran was two months away from acquiring enough material for a [nuclear] bomb. Now it will be 12 months." Ayalon said that opposition to the deal in Israel was "more emotional than logical". , the director of the Israeli intelligence agency
from 1998 to 2002, wrote in support of the agreement in , arguing that the JCPOA includes "components that are crucial for Israel's security" and warning that a collapse of the agreement will leave Iran "free to do as it pleases". Chuck Freilich, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and current senior fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center, wrote an
for The New York Times arguing that the JCPOA is "a good deal for Israel" and that by avoiding the threat of a nuclear Iran, the agreement "will enable Israel to divert precious resources to more immediate threats" and to pressing domestic needs.
 Italy
Prime Minister
said: "The agreement sows new hope for a regional peace project. Italy will actively support this process, and will ensure that it can benefit all countries of the region, without exception, with the aim of reaching a Middle East finally stable, where all peoples can live in peace and security".
 Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev welcomed the progress in the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Action Plan on the regulation of the situation around Iran's nuclear programme.
President Nazarbayev said, "... in 2013 Almaty hosted two rounds of talks on Iran's nuclear program, which contributed to the resumption of negotiations between "P5+1" and Iran. We are proud that the results of those two rounds of talks in Almaty have served as foundation for JCPOA adopted two years later."
 Kuwait: , the , congratulated all the nations involved in the negotiations and hoped the deal would lead to stability in the region.
 : Oman welcomed the agreement. Oman and its leader, Sultan , were praised for its key role in the talks by diplomats and leaders from both Iran and the P5+1. Oman has good relations with both Iran and the United States and played a key role in the be Oman offered to establish a back channel between Iran and the United States in 2009, and the first secret talks were held between U.S. and Iranian diplomats in July 2012 in .
 Qatar: The government welcomed the agreement as a "significant step" toward enhancing regional peace and stability.
 Saudi Arabia: On 14 July, the official
released a statement attributed to an "official source" saying, "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has always believed in the importance of reaching a deal regarding Iran's nuclear program that ensures preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and at the same time includes a specific, strict and permanent mechanism for inspecting all sites—including military ones—along with a mechanism for rapidly and effectively re-imposing sanctions in case Iran violates the deal." U.S. Secretary of Defense
said that Saudi Arabia approved of the international agreement, despite the fact that "the Saudis, along with other
Arab countries in the Persian Gulf, view the predominantly
Iran as a regional adversary." The Saudis have undertaken a military campaign in Yemen against
Elsewhere in the
 Afghanistan:
congratulated "the government and people of Islamic Republic of Iran on the occasion and reiterates that the government of Afghanistan welcomes any efforts that result in expansion of political and economic relations between states as well as consolidation and strengthening of peace and stability in the region."
 Egypt: The
said the deal will prevent an arms race in the Middle East. The statement expressed hopes that the Middle East can be free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.
 Iraq: The Iraqi government applauded the agreement.
 Pakistan: The
"welcomed" the agreement, saying, "reciprocal confidence-building measures ... auger well for peace and security in our region." Former President
welcomed the deal as "a triumph of diplomacy and negotiations over coercion and hostility" and called upon the government to push forward with plans for construction of an .
 Syria: President , an , called the agreement as "a great victory" and wrote in a letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Iranian supreme leader, that the agreement would be a "major turning point in the history of Iran, the region and the world".
 Turkey: The
welcomed the agreement in a statement saying that its implementation would contribute to regional peace, security and stability. Observers noted that although Turkey would benefit economically from the lifting of sanctions in the future, Turkish officials seemed to be "uneasy" of the potential for Iran to reemerge as a
that might overshadow Turkey.
Other countries
 Australia:
endorsed the agreement, saying: "What it has done is [bring] Iran into the international regime of inspections of nuclear programs, and that is a good thing. I think we have to give this comprehensive plan a chance."
 Canada:
stated at the time of the announcement: "We appreciate the efforts of the P5+1 to reach an agreement. At the same time, we will continue to judge Iran by its actions not its words. To this end, Canada will continue to support the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor Iran's compliance with its commitments." The
reported at the time that Canada would keep its sanctions in place, at least initially, although Canada's own sanctions will have little impact on the Iranian economy. While the Canadian government under Prime Minister
was opposed to the agreement, the
under Prime Minister
supported it, and in February 2016, following the implementation of the agreement, Canada lifted most of its sanctions on Iran.
 Colombia:
applauded the agreement as "another triumph of diplomacy over confrontation" and praised President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry for their "courage" in securing the deal.
 India: The Indian embassy in Tehran stated, "India welcomes the announcement of lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. The milestone represents a significant success for patient diplomacy and signals a new chapter of peace and prosperity. India looks forward to further developing its longstanding, close, and mutually beneficial economic cooperation with Iran, including in the spheres of energy and regional connectivity."
 North Korea: The
said that North Korea had no interest in a nuclear disarmament agreement, saying: "We do not have any interest at all on dialogue for unilaterally freezing or giving up our nukes."
 Norway: In a statement,
said: "This historic agreement will benefit the international community, the Middle East and Iran. It will also pave the way for closer political and economic contact with Iran."
 Philippines: The
welcomed the agreement, saying that it was an important measure to promote both regional and global security. They also called on the international community to maintain the positive momentum for long-term peace created by the agreement.
 United Nations
issued a statement saying: "I warmly welcome the historic agreement in Vienna today and congratulate the P5+1 and Iran for reaching this agreement. This is testament to the value of dialogue.... The United Nations stands ready to fully cooperate with the parties in the process of implementing this historic and important agreement."
(IAEA) – Director General
welcomed the agreement and congratulated Iran, the P5+1 countries and the European Union and said he is confident that IAEA is capable of doing the necessary monitoring and verification activities when requested.
Other international organizations and figures
 NATO
called the agreement a "historic breakthrough" and stated: "It is critical for Iran to implement the provisions of today's agreement and to fulfill all its international obligations and advance security in the region and beyond."
 Arab League
said he hoped the JCPOA would bring "stability and security" to the Middle East.
 Gulf Cooperation Council – The
publicly announced backing for the agreement at an 2 August 2015 summit in , . , the foreign minister of Qatar (which currently chairs the GCC) said at a news conference with U.S. Secretary of State Kerry following the summit, "This was the best option amongst other options in order to try to come up with a solution for the nuclear weapons of Iran though dialogue, and this came up as a result of the efforts exerted by the United States of America and its allies. [Secretary Kerry] let us know that there's going to be a kind of live oversight for Iran not to gain or to get any nuclear weapons. This is reassuring to the region."
– On 6 August 2015, following the 5th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers' Meeting, the foreign ministers of the 10 ASEAN nations, along with the foreign ministers of India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, endorsed the deal, welcoming it as an "important resolution" to a pressing global concern. Shortly before the joint ASEAN statement was released, U.S. Secretary of State Kerry met Japanese Foreign Minister
to mark the 70th anniversary of the .
, former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, hailed the agreement as a triumph of diplomacy.
called the deal "a triumph of nuclear diplomacy" and urged both the
to approve it.
Following the unveiling of the agreement, "a general consensus quickly emerged" among nuclear experts and watchdogs that the agreement "is as close to a best-case situation as reality would allow". In August 2015, 75 arms control and nuclear nonproliferation experts signed a statement endorsing the deal as "a net-plus for international nuclear nonproliferation efforts" that exceeds the historical standards for arms control agreements. The
invited top international security experts to comment on the final agreement.
, arms control expert and director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the , reviewed the final agreement and gave it a positive assessment, saying that he would give it an "A" grade. While Lewis was skeptical about the chances of a workable deal emerging in 2014, during the negotiations, Lewis said that the final agreement was "a good deal because it slows down [the Iranian] nuclear program ... And it puts monitoring and verification measures in place that mean if they try to build a bomb, we're very likely to find out, and to do so with enough time that we have options to do something about it. There's a verifiable gap between their bomb option and an actual bomb. That's why it's a good deal." Lewis said that the final agreement was very similar to the April 2015 framework agreement. Lewis does not believe that the agreement will fundamentally alter the U.S.-Iranian relationship, seeing the agreement instead as "a really straightforward measure to slow down an enrichment program that was going gangbusters".
and Katherine Blakeley, senior fellow and policy analyst, respectively, at the , wrote that the agreement was "one of the most comprehensive and detailed nuclear arms agreements ever reached". Korb and Blakeley wrote, "a good look at the three main legs of the agreement shows that this deal is, in fact, a good one, for the United States and for the international community." Korb and Blakey said that the agreement "precludes Iranian development of a nuclear weapon by shutting down all of the pathways Iran might use to accumulate enough nuclear material to make a weapon" and praised components of the agreement which keep Iran subject to the constraints of the , provides for robust IAEA monitoring and verification, and links the phased lifting of nuclear-related sanctions to IAEA verification of Iranian compliance.
, senior research physicist and professor of public and international affairs emeritus at the Program on Science and Global Security at , wrote, "The July 14 agreement is a political miracle" in which "Iran has agreed to back away from the nuclear-weapon threshold in exchange for a lifting of nuclear-related sanctions." Von Hippel wrote, "The Obama administration argues—and I agree—that the ratcheting back of Iran's enrichment capacity will give the world a much longer warning time should Iran attempt to build a bomb." Von Hippel suggested that once the first ten years of the agreement were complete, "One option that should be explored is multinational ownership and management of Iran's enrichment complex by a group of countries—perhaps including the United States."
, former CIA nonproliferation analyst and currently of the , wrote, "The provisions of this agreement . . . contains minor concessions by Iran but huge concessions by the United States that will Iran to continue its nuclear program with weak verification provisions. Conditions for sanctions relief will be very easy for Iran to meet. Iran will not only continue to enrich uranium under the agreement, it will continue to develop advanced centrifuges that will reduce the timeline to an Iranian nuclear bomb."
William H. Tobey, senior fellow at Harvard University's , was critical of the agreement, writing that given Iranian hostility to the United States and Israel, the agreement provides little "more than a speed bump on the path to Iran's nuclear ambition". Tobey wrote that that "speed bump" is not "a good trade for at least $150 billion in sanctions relief".
Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the , said that although the JCPOA is "not perfect", it "will be a net plus for nonproliferation and will enhance U.S. and regional security". Reif wrote that it was "clear that Tehran had to retreat from many of its initial demands, including in the areas of the scale of uranium enrichment it needed, the intrusiveness of inspections it would tolerate, and the pace of sanctions relief it would demand". Reif also wrote that the JCPOA "will keep Iran further away from the ability to make nuclear weapons for far longer than the alternative of additional sanctions or a military strike possibly could", and as a result, the threat of regional proliferation throughout the Middle East was diminished. Reif added: "A perfect deal was not attainable. Overall, it's a very strong and good deal, but it wasn't negotiations that resulted in a score o}