民用无人机安全事件烦发 上海九成以上航拍非法
来源：澎湃新闻
专家称上海九成以上航拍属非法，国家正制定相关管理办法拟进行分级分类监管。 CFP 资料图
　　民用无人机市场正不断升温，安全隐患正逐渐显现。
　　澎湃新闻（）记者日前查询发现，一家淘宝店铺某款无人机的月成交量已超过1200件。据网友反映，微信朋友圈也不断有人晒出无人机航拍视频。
　　无人机即无人驾驶飞机，最早可追溯到20世纪20年代，发展至今，民用无人机已经可被用于婚庆、新闻影视等需要航拍的领域，甚至被一些航模发烧友收集，用作飞行“玩具”。
　　与此同时，频频曝出的因操控失误引起的坠机事件引发争议，无人机坠机率高，且降落时容易发生人群聚集围观等意外情况。
　　工信部民航局适航性技术研究与管理中心专家苗延青认为，无人机的监管是世界性难题，中国颁布的相关管理规定有滞后性，目前需要集合全行业一同确保安全性。作为该标准的起草单位，工信部正在牵头做无人机分级分类管理标准，有四五十家各方单位共同参与，结合国内的实际情况把无人机的规范管理进一步推进。
　　市场：淘宝某款月成交1200件，今年全球销量增长55%
　　“这是我的新玩具”―今年5月下旬，谢思琪（化名）在微信朋友圈晒出一段使用某民用无人机拍摄的上海市徐汇区滨江滑板公园全景。他告诉澎湃新闻记者，民用无人机市场正在不断升温，“从小爱玩高科技”的他也想“尝鲜”。
　　“无人机拍摄的角度是一般相机取不到的。”谢思琪购得一台市场价为6400元人民币的黄色四螺旋桨无人机。这台无人机设有一个摄像头，并可以通过将智能手机或iPad放在操控板上来操纵整台无人机的运行情况。谢思琪的这台无人机可以飞离遥控器一百多米高、一公里远，持续飞行时间约为十分钟。
　　像谢思琪这样的消费者还有很多，不少网民在一些无人机论坛中表示，航拍功能是无人机最吸引人的一点，一些论坛还会举办航拍比赛、讨论航拍角度等。目前，民用无人机已被用于婚庆、新闻影视等需要航拍的领域，甚至被一些航模发烧友收集。
　　澎湃新闻记者从淘宝查询得知，目前所售卖的无人机各式各样，从一般几百元的遥控飞机至几十万元的专业测绘无人机，这些无人机大多搭载摄像头，可以通过飞行实时录像。类似搭载航拍功能的无人机机身尺寸从几厘米到几米不等，重量从几百克到十几公斤不等，使用Wi-Fi、GPS、无线电等手段连接操控板与无人机机身，续航时间从几分钟到几小时不等。在某无人机知名品牌的淘宝旗舰店中，一款价格在4000元人民币左右的无人机月成交量已达到1200件。
　　资料显示，今年1月首次开设的民用无人机展区成为美国拉斯维加斯国际消费电子展一大热点。据展会主办方美国消费电子协会预测，2015年全球民用无人机销量将达到40万架，销售额达到1.3亿美元，比去年增长55%。到2018年，预计全球无人机市场规模将会攀升到至少10亿美元。
　　安全：一网民5架坠毁3架，锋利螺旋桨蹭到就受伤
　　随着市场快速打开，谢思琪似乎对自己的“入门机器”并不满足，6月中旬，他又购入了一台价格在8000元左右、性能更好的无人机。“必须谨慎操作，掉下来的话就基本是炸鸡（损坏）了，而且返修价格挺高。”他坦言，自己主要通过阅读说明书、看网络视频等手段来自学操控无人机，“玩这种东西一般飞之前要详细看看说明书，上面包括地形、操作规范等事项都要注意，一般来说是要在空旷的地方飞，机场附近肯定不能飞的。”
　　“炸鸡”是指无人机坠毁，而无人机坠毁频次较高。网民“fangxiwei”认为，每一个无人机的归宿都是“炸鸡”。他称自己曾有5架无人机，已经坠毁3架，且最多飞行次数的一架无人机只飞过60次，“到最后越来越不敢飞远，越来越不敢飞高”。
　　某品牌无人机旗舰店工作人员告诉澎湃新闻记者，新手操作时有注意事项：“建议飞行之前，详细阅读说明书，了解飞行器的基本功能；飞矮一点稳一点，把起飞和降落练习熟悉，还有遥控器操作杆动作都要熟悉；飞行时候远离水区、密集建筑物、人群这些地方，避免造成人员损伤。”
　　某无人机店铺销售人员谈到无人机禁飞区域的问题时称，只要不在北京六环以内、新疆部分地区等禁飞地区飞行就可以，上海目前没有禁飞区。
　　然而，即便是在购买时告知消费者这些必要的安全事项、且消费者仔细阅读说明书的情况下，也不能避免发生意外情况。
　　7月2日，网民“唐山小胖”在某无人机论坛上讲述了他的经历：“本人胆小，平时一直坚持躲开人多的地方、绝不在人头上飞的原则。今天航拍湖面，等返航时，身后已聚集一帮群众，天啊！”当天航拍返航时，他突然发现湖岸周围的人都聚集至预备降落处，原定降落地点已无空处给无人机安全降落，虽然他劝人群远离该降落点后，露出约5×5米的空地，但他不敢轻易让无人机降落。“全都是人！我没胆！”他这样写道。
　　在飞机离地还有2米左右时，一个孩子快速跑过飞机下方，他坦言虽然平时坚持练习模拟飞行器，立即将无人机拉离地面，但仍然非常后怕。“下次再飞得找维持秩序的帮忙了。要不长期背卷警戒带，现场来警戒？”
　　另有网民透露，一些无人机的螺旋桨相当锋利，平时不小心蹭到就会在皮肤上留下伤口，如在人群密集地降落后果不堪设想。
　　监管：上海九成以上属“黑飞”，中国正在制定管理办法
　　“现在一些大的无人机都需要执照，但像我的这种小型的似乎是不需要。”谢思琪认为，虽然并不希望今后玩这种小无人机需要有很繁复的审定程序，但他也在担忧无人机驾驶者的资质问题，“现在菜鸟越来越多，一些未成年的学生都买来玩，我感觉有点危险了，万一出什么事很难处理。”
　　澎湃新闻记者查阅资料发现，对于管控无人机飞行的法规要追溯到2009年以来陆续颁布的《民用无人机空中交通管理规定》、《民用无人机适航管理工作会议纪要》、《民用无人驾驶航空器系统驾驶员管理暂行规定》、《低空域使用管理规定》等规定。
　　其中，《民用无人机空中交通管理规定》明确―“组织实施民用无人机活动的单位和个人应当按照《通用航空飞行管制条例》等规定申请划设和使用空域，接受飞行活动管理和空中交通服务，保证飞行安全。”
　　而中国2013年出台的《民用无人驾驶航空器系统驾驶员管理暂行规定》将各类无人机分为微型、轻型、小型、大型四种类型，其中明确将“空机质量小于等于7千克的无人机”定义为“微型无人机”，将“空机质量大于7千克，但小于等于116千克的无人机，且全马力平飞中，校正空速小于100千米/小时（55海里/小时），升限小于3000米”定义为“轻型无人机”。
　　像谢思琪所购买的这类无人机，恰属于“微型无人机”。
　　此外该规定还指出，在下列三种情况下，无人机系统驾驶员自行负责，无需证照管理：在室内运行的无人机；在视距内运行的微型无人机；在人烟稀少、空旷的非人口稠密区进行试验的无人机。
　　但这些规定似乎都不能实际管控到日益扩大的民用无人机市场，工信部民航局适航性技术研究与管理中心专家苗延青告诉澎湃新闻记者，无人机的监管是世界性难题，“现在连界定都很难说清楚，就比如像市场上售卖的一些航拍无人机，它到底是航模还是无人机呢？多重以上的无人机要管呢？怎么去界定安全问题？这都是很复杂的。”
　　2009年，民航局颁布的《关于民用无人机管理有关问题的暂行规定》中就讲到，无人机需要走适航审定程序。“但无人机和有人机的适航审定不同，需要办理临时国籍登记证、特许飞行证等证件，而特许飞行证需要经过《民用航空产品和零部件适航证件的颁发和管理程序》的批复，这里面有非常详细的规定，所有无人机都必须取证之后才可以飞。”苗延青说道。
　　那么现在市场上所售卖的微型无人机也要取得证件后才可以飞吗？苗延青认为，2009年所颁布的规定滞后，沿用至今已是“一刀切”式的管理方式，类似市场上的航拍无人机处在尴尬的地位。“不光是我们国家，其他国家思路也都很一致，对于无人机没有太多分类的概念。当时美国也是禁止无人机随便进行商业运营等活动，所有无人机都必须取得豁免，中国也一样，需要取得特许飞行证。实际上，今年年初美国、欧洲的政策有变动，他们对无人机做了一个分级分类。”
　　苗延青透露，中国正在制定类似划定分类以及之后一系列配套措施等无人机管理办法，“工信部正在牵头做无人机分级分类管理标准，也是该标准的起草单位，有四五十家各方单位共同参与，结合国内的实际情况把无人机的规范管理进一步推进。”但他表示，具体规定的出台时间未定。
　　此外，上海市航空车辆模型协会副会长李先生曾向媒体表示，“除非有关部门认可，（否则）外场飞行是不合法的，涉嫌扰乱社会治安。就像无驾照横冲直撞一样。空域管理这几年发生了变化，目前500米以上归航空部门管，500米以下归国家体育总局航空无线电模型运动管理中心管理。无人机的飞行高度不能超过500米，只有通过专门的考试，才能获得飞行许可证。从这个层面来讲，上海九成以上的无人机航拍都是非法的。获得飞行资格的更是寥寥无几。
　　今年7月中旬开始，第一批飞行资格培训即将开班，不过培训只有航模协会会员才能报名。考试包含应知部分与应会部分两部分，应知部分包括理论的学习与巩固，而应会部分则包括技能的反复训练，飞行执照有效期为三年。
　　相关新闻：无人机事故频发，曾险些撞上A320客机
　　全球各地频发无人机安全事故，例如违规运载、影响民航正常运行、坠毁导致财务损失及人员伤亡等。记者查阅资料发现自2013年起，无人机安全事故发生次数上升，2015年尤为频发。
　　2013年7月，上海一家蛋糕店计划使用一架直径1.1米、形似小型直升机的无人机配送蛋糕，引来网友纷纷质疑：蛋糕一旦脱落，会对地面的人和物体造成怎样影响；如果飞机出现故障，是否会失控砸伤路人？随后这一计划因安全问题被有关部门无限期暂停。
　　日，首都机场以东空域有一架由航模改装的无人机进行飞行，严重干扰机场航班秩序。经查，此次飞行活动没有履行报批程序申请空域，致使首都机场十余班次飞机延迟起飞，两班次实施空中避让。
　　日，一架无人机险些撞上一辆从伦敦希斯罗机场开出的A320空中巴士。该无人机距离当时离地面约为1700英尺高度的空巴客机仅不到50英尺。
　　日，一架携带冰毒的无人机欲从墨西哥进入美国边境。据悉，该无人机在墨西哥城的提华纳市超市停车场携带了超过六英镑的晶体脱氧麻黄碱。美国禁药取缔机构表示，无人机已成为运输毒品过境的常见手段。
　　日，一架无人机坠毁于美国白宫草坪上。白宫的工作人员难以准确探测出这架无人机的来源，因此，在此事发生后不久，白宫便进入防范禁闭状态。
　　日，一架无人机坠落在日本首相官邸的屋顶上。而在当晚，又有一架无人机坠落在英国驻日本大使馆内，后被认定属于东京一家电视台所有。
　　2015年6月，英国警方查获了在全英草地网球俱乐部上空飞行的无人机。温布尔登网球公开赛在这一场地举行，警方表示无人机已经被没收，原因是违反了人、车、或建筑物50米范围禁飞小型飞行器的法律。这次发生的事情让监管机构将体育场馆也列入禁飞名单。
　　日，两位南京市民在使用一架价格为18000元的航拍无人机航拍时，机器受风干扰失控竟掉进了地铁1号线药科大学站附近高架轨行区内，造成列车延误两分钟。地铁工作人员称，若撞上列车或碰到接触网，后果将不堪设想。
　　日，有媒体报道大疆牌无人机高空坠落，砸坏路边停泊车辆，险些伤人。当事人广东省深圳市福田沙尾村王先生表示，自己停在店铺外的私家车被突然坠落的飞行器砸坏，车上的挡风玻璃和前面的整门全部损坏。
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这是一个简介（概括），完整的报告是一个200页的PDF来源：NTSB 官方网站Descent Below Visual Glidepath and Impact With Seawall, Asiana Airlines Flight 214San Francisco, CaliforniaJuly 6, 2013NTSB Number: AAR-14-01NTIS Number: PBAdopted: June 24, 2014Executive SummaryOn July 6, 2013, about 1128 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 777-200ER, Korean registration HL7742, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California. Three of the 291 passengers
40 passengers, 8 of the 12 flight attendants, and 1 of the 4 flight crewmembers received serious injuries. The other 248 passengers, 4 flight attendants, and 3 flight crewmembers received minor injuries or were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 214 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Incheon International Airport, Seoul, Korea, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed.The flight was vectored for a visual approach to runway 28L and intercepted the final approach course about 14 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold at an altitude slightly above the desired 3° glidepath. This set the flight crew up for a straight- however, after the flight crew accepted an air traffic control instruction to maintain 180 knots to 5 nm from the runway, the flight crew mismanaged the airplane's descent, which resulted in the airplane being well above the desired 3° glidepath when it reached the 5 nm point. The flight crew's difficulty in managing the airplane's descent continued as the approach continued. In an attempt to increase the airplane's descent rate and capture the desired glidepath, the pilot flying (PF) selected an autopilot (A/P) mode (flight level change speed [FLCH SPD]) that instead resulted in the autoflight system initiating a climb because the airplane was below the selected altitude. The PF disconnected the A/P and moved the thrust levers to idle, which caused the autothrottle (A/T) to change to the HOLD mode, a mode in which the A/T does not control airspeed. The PF then pitched the airplane down and increased the descent rate. Neither the PF, the pilot monitoring (PM), nor the observer noted the change in A/T mode to HOLD.
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As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana's procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain t these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below t the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew's insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance.When the main landing gear and the aft fuselage struck the seawall, the tail of the airplane broke off at the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane slid along the runway, lifted partially into the air, spun about 330°, and impacted the ground a final time. The impact forces, which exceeded certification limits, resulted in the inflation of two slide/rafts within the cabin, injuring and temporarily trapping two flight attendants. Six occupants were ejected from the airplane during the impact sequence: two of the three fatally injured passengers and four of the seriously injured flight attendants. The four flight attendants were wearing their restraints but were ejected due to the destruction of the aft galley where they were seated. The two ejected passengers (one of whom was later rolled over by two firefighting vehicles) were not wearing their seatbelts and would likely have remained in the cabin and survived if they had been wearing their seatbelts.After the airplane came to a stop, a fire initiated within the separated right engine, which came to rest adjacent to the right side of the fuselage. When one of the flight attendants became aware of the fire, he initiated an evacuation, and 98% of the passengers successfully self-evacuated. As the fire spread into the fuselage, firefighters entered the airplane and extricated five passengers (one of whom later died) who were injured and unable to evacuate. Overall, 99% of the airplane's occupants survived.
The safety issues discussed in the report relate to the need for the following:Adherence of Asiana pilots to standard operating procedures (SOP) regarding callouts. The flight crew did not consistently adhere to Asiana's SOPs involving selections and callouts pertaining to the autoflight system's mode control panel. This lack of adherence is likely the reason that the PF did not call out "flight level change" when he selected FLCH SPD. As a result, and because the PM's attention was likely on changing the flap setting at that time, the PM did not notice that FLCH SPD was engaged.Reduced design complexity and enhanced training on the airplane's autoflight system. The PF had an inaccurate understanding of how the Boeing 777 A/P and A/T systems interact to control airspeed in FLCH SPD mode, what happens when the A/T is overridden and the throttles transition to HOLD in a FLCH SPD descent, and how the A/T automatic engagement feature operates. The PF's faulty mental model of the airplane's automation logic led to his inadvertent deactivation of automatic airspeed control. Both reduced design complexity and improved systems training can help reduce the type of error that the PF made.Opportunity at Asiana for new instructors to supervise trainee pilots in operational service during instructor training. The PM was an experienced 777 captain who was on his first flight as an instructor pilot supervising a trainee captain gaining operating experience. The PM did not have the opportunity during his instructor training to supervise and instruct a trainee during line operations while being observed by an experienced instructor. Such an opportunity would have improved the PM's awareness of the dynamic and often unpredictable challenges that an instructor must deal with when supervising a trainee during line operations.
Guidance for Asiana pilots on use of flight directors during a visual approach. During the accident flight, after the A/P was disconnected, the PM loosely followed Asiana's informal practice, which was to turn both flight directors (F/Ds) off and then turn the PM's F/D back on when conducting a visual approach. However, the two F/D switches were not both in the off position at the same time. If they had been, the A/T mode would have changed to speed mode and maintained the approach speed of 137 knots. In addition, during a visual approach, F/D pitch and roll guidance is not needed and can be a distraction.More manual flight for Asiana pilots. Asiana's automation policy emphasized the full use of all automation and did not encourage manual flight during line operations. If the PF had been provided with more opportunity to manually fly the 777 during training, he would most likely have better used pitch trim, recognized that the airspeed was decaying, and taken the appropriate corrective action of adding power. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance and a recent US regulatory change support the need for pilots to regularly perform manual flight so that their airplane handling skills do not degrade.A context-dependent low energy alert. The airplane was equipped with a low airspeed alerting system that was designed to alert flight crews to low airspeed in the cruise phase of flight for the purpose of stall avoidance. However, this accident demonstrates that existing low airspeed alert systems that are designed to provide pilots with redundant aural and visual warning of impending hazardous low airspeed conditions may be ineffective when they are developed for one phase of flight (e.g., cruise) and are not adequately tailored to reflect conditions that may be important in another phase of flight (e.g., approach). During the approach phase of flight, a low airspeed alert may need to be designed so that its activation threshold takes airspeed (kinetic energy), altitude (potential energy), and engine response time into account.Research that examines the injury potential from significant lateral forces in airplane crashes and the mechanism that produces high thoracic spinal injuries. In this accident, the dynamics were such that occupants were thrown forward and experienced a significant lateral force to the left during the impact sequence. One passenger sustained serious head injuries as a result of striking the arm rest of the seat that was in front of and to his left. While current FAA dynamic seat certification requirements do include testing row/row seat interactions with seats positioned slightly off the longitudinal axis, they would not likely approximate the forces encountered in this accident. Further, there was a high number of serious injuries to the high thoracic spine in this accident, and the mechanism that produces these injuries is poorly understood.
Evaluation of the adequacy of slide/raft inertia load certification testing. The forces experienced by the slide/rafts during the impact sequence far exceeded their certification limits, leading to overload failures of the slide/raft release mechanisms on the 1R and 2R slide/rafts. Given the critical nature of these evacuation devices and their proximity to essential crewmembers, slides and slide/rafts must be certified to sufficient loads so that they will likely function in a survivable accident. Although this exact accident scenario is unlikely to occur again, the data obtained during this accident investigation could prove useful for future slide/raft design.Aircraft rescue and firefighting (ARFF) training for officers placed in command of an aircraft accident. The arriving incident commander placed an officer in charge of the fire attack who had not received ARFF training, and this individual made decisions that reflected his lack of ARFF training. Although no additional injuries or loss of life could be attributed to the fire attack supervisor's lack of ARFF training, it demonstrates the potential strategic and tactical challenges associated with having nonARFF trained personnel in positions of command at an airplane accident.Guidance on when to pierce the fuselage of a burning airplane with a skin-piercing nozzle. The airport's fire department had two vehicles equipped with high-reach extendable turrets (HRETs) that were not used to the best of their capabilities in the initial attack. This was partially the result of departmental guidance that discouraged penetration of the fuselage using the skin-piercing nozzles on the HRETs until all of the occupants were known to have evacuated the airplane. Current FAA guidance provides information on how to pierce but does not include any guidance on when to pierce.
Integration of the medical supply buses at SFO into the airport's preparation drills. Although the airport's emergency procedures manual called for airport operations personnel to deliver the airport's two emergency medical buses to the accident site, neither of the medical buses arrived. Further, the monthly emergency drills conducted by the airport did not include deployment of the buses either as a matter of routine or as part of the unique scenario being evaluated. This lack of integration of the medical buses into the airport's preparation drills likely played a part in their lack of use in the initial response to the accident.Guidance or protocols for ensuring the safety of passengers and crew at risk of being struck or rolled over by a vehicle during ARFF operations. In this case, only one passenger was at significant risk for a vehicle strike due to her close proximity to
however, there are other accident scenarios in which many injured or deceased persons could be located near an accident airplane. There is currently no guidance or any recommended protocols for ensuring the safety of passengers and crew at risk of being struck or rolled over by a vehicle during ARFF operations.Requirements for ARFF staffing. Seven ARFF vehicles and 23 ARFF personnel from SFO's fire department were involved in the initial response to the accident. This equipment level exceeded the FAA-required minimum of three vehicles, and there is currently no FAA-required minimum staffing level. Because of the amount of available ARFF vehicles and personnel, the airport firefighters were able to perform exterior firefighting and send firefighters into the airplane who rescued five passengers who were unable to self-evacuate amid rapidly deteriorating cabin conditions. Due to the lack of an FAA-required minimum staffing level, passengers involved in an aviation accident at a smaller airport may not be afforded the same level of protection that the passengers of flight 214 had.Improvements in emergency communications at SFO. Numerous problems with communications occurred during the emergency response, the most critical being the inability for responding mutual aid units to speak directly with units from the airport on a common radio frequency. Although some of the communications difficulties encountered during the emergency response, including the lack of radio interoperability, have been remedied, others, such as the breakdown in communications between the airport and city dispatch centers, should be addressed.Increased FAA oversight of SFO's emergency procedures manual. Although the airport had submitted, and the FAA had approved in December 2012, an updated emergency procedures manual, the airport had not yet distributed or trained personnel on the updated manual when the accident occurred and was still actively operating with the manual approved by the FAA in December 2008.
As a result of this investigation, the NTSB makes safety recommendations to the FAA, Asiana Airlines, Boeing, the Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting Working Group, and the City and County of San Francisco.Probable CauseThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew's mismanagement of the airplane's descent during the visual approach, the PF's unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew's inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew's delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances. Contributing to the accident were (1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing's documentation and Asiana's pilot training, which increased the like (2) the flight crew's nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot fli (3) the PF's inadequate training on the planning and execution
(4) the PM/instructor pilot's inadequate supervision of the PF; and (5) flight crew fatigue, which likely degraded their performance. ***********************************分割线***********************************翻译什么的就开学以后吧，假期里还有其他的一些东西想学。字！数！限！制！你！妹！！！
驾驶员全责肯定没错。不过话说回来，如果飞行中有人无意触碰油门杆，导致AT进入HOLD模式，而机组又疏于监控，岂不是很危险。 这种对飞行安全有直接影响且至关重要的系统，应该有告诫系统进行保护吧。如果AT运行过程中人工干预油门，则AT脱开，并有声音和灯光提示，是不是更合理点。
下降至目视下滑道以下并撞击防波堤，韩亚航空214航班。三藩市，加利福尼亚。7月6号，2013.NTSB编号：AAR-14-01NTIS编号：PB采纳于：6月24日，2014综合概述：太平洋夏令时时间日，一架韩国籍注册号为HL7742的波音777-200ER型飞机，执行韩亚航空214航班，在加州三藩市国际机场（SFO）向28L跑道进近过程中，撞上机场防波堤。3名乘客遇难；40名乘客、12名乘务组人员中的8名、4名飞行机组中的1名受重伤；其余248名乘客、4名乘务员、3名飞行机组人员轻伤或无恙。飞机因撞击力和随之产生的大火损毁。214次航班是从韩国首尔仁川国际机场出发的常规定期国际旅客航班，按照CFR129部运行。目视气象条件良好，并且仪表飞行规则飞行计划已提交。航班被引导至28L跑道进行目视进近，并在据跑道入口14海里处切入最后进近航迹，飞机高度略高于理想的3°下滑道。此时机组可以执行目视进场直接进近。然而，在机组接受管制员下达的保持180节直至距跑道5海里的指令后，机组对飞机的下降疏于监控，导致飞机距跑道5海里时远高于3°下滑道，继续进近的过程中，机组对飞机下降的控制仍然不佳。为了尝试增加下降率以截获理想的下滑道，把杆飞行员（PF）选择了自动驾驶的高度改变速度模式（FLCH SPD），这反而导致了自动驾驶系统开始爬升，因为飞机当时正低于选定的高度。把杆飞行员脱开自动驾驶并将油门杆收至慢车位，这导致自动油门系统（AT）进入HOLD模式，这种模式下自动油门不再保持控诉。随后，把杆飞行员压低机头并增大下降率。无论是把杆飞行员、监控飞行员，抑或是观察员，都没有意识到自动油门已转入HOLD模式。--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------剩下的留给楼主慢慢翻。。
谢谢了=.=。200页的PDF==b
补充一下，控诉==》空速，有错字。14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129
不知道该怎么翻。还有，网上其实有翻译过的版本。。
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