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发表时间： 12:48
美媒：:美国真的会和中国开战吗? &&
菜古子 发表在
华声论坛 .cn/forum-70-1.html
　　正文翻译:
　　（译注：凉战 - 命名原因
　　新的战争称之为“凉战”而非“冷战”主要有两个原因：
　　它有着“凉战”定义的另一面，因为这种战争涉及最先进的技术，与冷战时期采用的手段相比，它们正在更大程度上改变战争的模式。
　　凉战不涉及战场上的激烈冲突。
　　造成冲突不断升级。）
　　Arewe on the brink of a new Cold War? The question isn&t as outlandish as itseemed only a few years ago. The United States is still the sole reigningsuperpower, but it is being challenged by the rising power of China, just asancient Rome was challenged by Carthage, and Britain was challenged by Germanyin the years before World War I. Should we therefore think of the United Statesand China as we once did about the United States and the Soviet Union, twogladiators doomed to an increasingly globalized combat until one side fades?
　　我们正处在新冷战的边缘？现在问这个问题不像前几年那样让人觉得奇怪了。美国仍然是世界唯一的超级强国，但面临正在崛起的中国的挑战，就像古罗马面临迦太基、英国在一战前面临德国的挑战一样。我们应当就此把美中关系想象成美苏那样，两强之间必须展开一场全球范围内的争夺最终决出胜负为止吗？
　　Thisis the central global question of our as-yet-unnamed historical moment. Whatwill happen now that America&s post-Cold War engagements in Iraq and Afghanistanhave run their courses and U.S. attention has pivoted to Asia? Can the UnitedStates continue to engage China while somehow hedging against the strategicthreat it poses? Can China go on seeing the United States as both an object ofemulation and a barrier to its rightful place on the world stage?
　　在如今这个历史年代这是最关键的全球难题。美国冷战后在伊拉克和阿富汗的两场战争已接近尾声，并将中心东移向亚洲区域，这会带来什么变化？有人要对中国带来的战略威胁进行遏制的时候，美国还能继续和中国进行合作吗？中国能够理智地看清美国的双重身份：效仿的对象和它在世界舞台争取应有地位的绊脚石。
　　Theanswer to these questions is a paradox: the paradox of Cool War.
　　Theterm Cool War aims to capture two different, contradictory historicaldevelopments that are taking place simultaneously: A classic struggle for powerbetween two countries is unfolding at the same time that economic cooperationbetween them is becoming deeper and more fundamental.
　　问题的答案也是自相矛盾的：凉战这一矛盾的说法。
　　凉战一词包括了两个截然不同、相互矛盾且同时发生的历史进程：实力不断扩展的两强之间展开传统的角力，但与此同时相互间的经贸合作日益深化和紧要。
　　Thecurrent situation differs from global power struggles of the past. The world&smajor power and its leading challenger are economically interdependent to anunprecedented degree. China needs the United States to continue buying itsproducts. The United States needs China to continue lending it money. Theireconomic fates are, for the foreseeable future, tied together. At the sametime, China&s consistent military growth and increasingly aggressive stance inthe seas that surround it portend regional struggle. The United States hasofficially &pivoted& to Asia, which means that it has acknowledgedthe strategic reality that China is the only country on Earth with the capacityand will to strip it of its current superpower status. In the first decade ofthe 21st century, the major international question was the relation betweenIslam and democracy. In this second decade of this still-young century, thegreat issues of conflict and cooperation have shifted. Now U.S. leadership andWestern democracy are juxtaposed with China&s global aspirations and itsprotean, emergent governing system. The effects of terrorism can still be felt,as they were recently in Boston, and America&s political and media elite oftenstill acts as if the Middle East is the only region that matters for U.S.national security. But for more farsighted observers and policymakers,attention is already shifting east.
　　现在的局势和往日世界强国争霸时不同。世界超级强国和它的主要竞争者在经济上的依赖程度前所未有。中国需要美国继续购买它的产品，美国需要中国继续放贷。在可预见的未来，它们的命运休戚与共。与此同时，中国不断增长的军事实力和在周边海域日趋强硬的姿态预示着将来在区域内可能会有战争。美国公开宣布亚洲“轴心”战略表明，美国意识到中国是世界上唯一有能力也有意愿挑战它当前世界超级强国地位的战略现实。21世纪头10年，世界面临的主要问题是伊斯兰和民主问题。新世纪的第二个10年里，竞争和合作成为主题。如今美国的领导力、西方的民主制度和中国的世界抱负、能力及新型管理机制并存。恐怖主义威胁仍然存在，如最近的波士顿爆炸，美国的政治和媒体精英常常表现得好像中东才是唯一影响美国国家安全的地区。但更睿智的观察者和决策者的重心已经东移。
　　Thestakes of the debate over whether to contain China or engage it could notpossibly be higher. One side argues that the United States must either acceptdecline or prepare for war. Only by military strength can the United Statesconvince China that it is not worth challenging America&s status as the solesuperpower. Projecting weakness would lead to instability and make war all themore likely. The other side counters that trying to contain China is the worstthing the United States can do. Excessive defense spending will make the UnitedStates less competitive economically. Worse, it will encourage China to becomeaggressive itself, leading to an arms race that neither side wants and that woulditself increase the chance of violence. Much better, they argue, to engageChina politically and economically and encourage it to share the burdens ofsuperpower status.
　　遏制还是接触中国，在这点上的争论最为激烈。一方认为美国必须接受衰退的事实否则就要准备开战，美国的军事实力是让中国放弃挑战美国唯一超级大国地位的唯一手段。美国的衰弱将导致不稳定且更容易引发战争。而另一方则相反，认为遏制中国是最糟糕的想法。巨额的国防开支会降低美国的经济竞争力。更糟糕的是，这会逼迫中国变得更加强硬，引发双方都不乐见的军备竞赛，而这本身就加大了冲突的可能性。他们认为更好的方式是从政治和经济上与中国接触，并鼓励它共同承担起超级大国的责任。
　　Whatwe need is to change the way we think and talk about the U.S.-Chinarelationship -- to develop an alternative to simple images of inevitableconflict or utopian cooperation. We need a way to understand the new structurethat draws on historical precedent while recognizing why things are differentthis time. We need to understand where the United States and China can see eyeto eye and where they cannot compromise. Most of all, we need a way forward tohelp avoid the real dangers that lie ahead.
　　我们应该改变对美中关系的思考和讨论方式，不再简单化地认为冲突不可避免或是乐观主义的合作。我们应该采用新的思维方式，既参照历史同时又看到当前的不同。我们应该清醒地认识到，在哪些地方美中可以和谐共处，在哪些地方它们难以达成妥协。最关键的是，我们应该找到避免将来可能的现实威胁的办法。
　　Wealso need a more sophisticated understanding of the Chinese Communist Party. Nolonger ideologically communist, the leadership is pragmatic and committed topreserving its position of power. It seeks to maintain legitimacy throughcontinued growth, regular transitions, and a tentative form of publicaccountability. It aims to manage deep internal divisions between entitledprincelings and self-made meritocrats via a hybrid system that makes room forboth types of elites.
　　我们还需要对中共有更为成熟的理解。它不再是共产教条主义，它的领导层秉持现实主义且努力维护执政地位。它希望通过发展、稳健的政权交接和在公众问责方面的试验来维护政权合法性。它希望控制世袭精英和通过自身努力脱颖而出的精英间的社会鸿沟，建立一种能给上述两者都提供发展空间的复合体制。
　　Theemerging Cool War will have profound significance for countries around theworld, for institutions that exist to keep the peace through internationalcooperation, for multinational corporations that operate everywhere, and forthe future of human rights. Ultimately, like the Cold War before it, this newkind of international engagement will involve every country on Earth.
　　凉战对世界各国、通过国际合作维护世界和平的各个机构、各多边合作机制和世界人权都将造成深刻的影响。最终会像之前的冷战一样，这个国际新问题将影响世界所有各国。
　　Apowerful argument can be made that despite its economic rise, China will nottry to challenge the position of the United States as the preeminent globalleader because of the profound economic interdependence between the twocountries. This is the essence of the official, though dated, Chinese slogan of&peaceful rise.& Trade accounts for half of China&s GDP, with exportssignificantly out-stripping imports. The United States alone accounts forroughly 25 percent of Chinese sales. Total trade between the countries amountsto a stunning $500 billion a year. The Chinese government holds some $1.2trillion in U.S. Treasury debt, or 8 percent of the outstanding total. Only theU.S. Federal Reserve and the Social Security
all Americanhouseholds combined hold less.
　　有一种很有影响的观点认为，虽然中国经济发展迅速，但因为两国间经济依赖程度很深，中国不会挑战美国世界超级大国的地位。中国一直以来的官方宣传“和平崛起”所指的就是这个。外贸总额占中国国内生产总值的一半，其中出口明显大于进口。美国占到中国出口额的25%，两国间的年度贸易总额是惊人的5000亿美元。中国政府持有1.2万亿美国国债，高达总数的8%。仅比美联储和社保基金少，比全体美国家庭持有的比例还高。
　　Asof the most recent count, 194,000 Chinese students attend U.S.some 70,000 Americans live and study and work in mainland China. We are nolonger in the realm of ping-pong diplomacy: We are in the world of economic andcultural partnership. These many cooperative projects require trust,credibility, and commitment -- all of which were lacking between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union.
　　根据最新统计数据，19万4千中国学生就读美国大学，大约有7万美国人在中国大陆生活、学习或工作。我们已不再是乒乓外交的时代：如今经济和文化合作都在蓬勃发展。这些合作项目需要相互的信任、信誉和责任，而这些在美苏间是不存在的。
　　Inthe long run, China would like to rely less on exports and expand its customerbase to include a bigger domestic market. The United States, for its part,would clearly prefer a more dispersed ownership of its debt. But for now, eachside is stuck. For the foreseeable future, the U.S.-China economic relationshipis going to remain a tight mutual embrace.
　　从长远来看，中国将减少对出口的依赖并扩大国内市场在内的消费市场。而美国则肯定希望其债权人更为分散。但就目前而言，双方都难以作出实质性举动。在可预见的未来，美中经济关系将紧密联系在一起。
　　Theargument that the United States and China will not find themselves in astruggle for global power depends on one historical fact: Never before has thedominant world power been so economically interdependent with the risingchallenger it must confront. Under these conditions, trade and debt provideoverwhelming economic incentives to avoid conflict that would be costly to all.Over time, the two countries& mutual interests will outweigh any tensions thatarise between them.
　　认为美中之间不可能为展开世界领导权之战的观点是基于这样一个历史事实：世界领导大国和崛起的竞争者之间的经济依赖程度之深前所未见。在这种情况下，贸易和债务关系有压倒性的经济影响力，要求避免对所有人都代价沉重的冲突。久而久之，两国间的共同利益会比任何紧张局势更加重要。
　　Appealingas this liberal internationalist argument may be, seen through the lens ofrealism, China&s economic rise, accompanied by America&s relative economicdecline, changes the global balance of power. It gives China the means,opportunity, and motive to alter the global arrangement in which the UnitedStates is the world&s sole superpower. According to the logic of realism, thetwo countries are therefore already at odds in a struggle for geopoliticaldominance. Under the circumstances, a shooting war is not unavoidable -- butconflict is.
　　这个国际自由主义色彩的论调确实很有吸引力，但从现实角度来看，伴随着美国经济相对衰落而来的中国的经济崛起，改变了世界力量平衡。这给了中国可能、机会和动机来改变美国是唯一超级大国的世界局势。从现实角度考虑，两国世界统治地位的角逐已经打响。当然基于当前的局势，热战并非不可避免，但冲突可能发生。
　　Ofall the potential direct flash points for real violent conflict between theUnited States and China, Taiwan is the scariest. In 2012, Tsai Ing-wen&sDemocratic Progressive Party won 47 percent of the vote on a platform of activeindependence. This was a sign that younger Taiwanese want to solidify the defacto independence they have enjoyed for most of their lives. The best Chineseoffer is one state, two systems -- along the lines of Hong Kong -- and mostTaiwanese tell pollsters they consider that unacceptable. If Tsai or anotherlike-minded politician were to be elected in the future and Beijing wanted to shoreup its legitimacy by distracting the public from a lagging economy, a hawkishChinese leadership with close ties to the People&s Liberation Army could sendan as-yet-unbuilt aircraft carrier into the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. presidentwould then face an immediate and pressing dilemma: to respond in kind, invitingwar, or to hold back and compromise America&s global superpower status in aninstant. The Cuban missile crisis looked a lot like this.
　　在所有可能引爆美中间武装冲突的导火索中，台湾问题最有可能。2012年，蔡英文任主席的民进党秉持积极台独理念赢得了47%的选票。这表明台湾年轻一代希望维持在他们记事以来一直持续的事实独立局面。中国方面的提议是按照香港模式实行一国两制，但台湾民意调查显示这个不被接受。如果将来蔡英文或者其他秉承相似理念的政治家当选，而中国想要转移国内对经济乏力的注意力时，有解放军做后盾的鹰派领导人可能会将目前未完工的航母部署到台湾海峡。那时美国总统将面临紧迫的局面：以可能导致战争的强硬立场回应，或是退后一步立刻放弃美国的世界超级大国。古巴导弹危机和此情况非常相似。
　　Butto alter the balance of power in a fundamental way, China does not need toreach military parity with the United States -- and once again, Taiwan is thedemonstration case. From Beijing&s standpoint, the optimal strategy toward Taiwanis to build up China&s military capacity and acquire the island without afight. The idea is that the United States might be prepared to tolerate theabandonment of its historical ally out of necessity, the way Britain cededcontrol over Hong Kong when it had no choice.
　　要从根本上改变力量平衡，中国并不需要有和美国相当的军事实力，台湾就是个例证。在中国看来，最理想的台湾战略是提升中国军事实力并和平统一台湾。这个概念就是在必要的情况下美国可能会抛弃盟友，就像英国别无选择之下放弃对香港的控制。
　　Tosee why this scenario is so plausible, all that is required is to ask thefollowing question: Would the president of the United States go to war withChina over Taiwan absent some high-profile immediate crisis capable ofmobilizing domestic support? If the United States were to abandon Taipei, itwould have to insist to China, as well as Japan, South Korea, and U.S.citizens, that Taiwan was in a basic sense different from the rest of Asia --that the United States would protect Asian allies from hegemony despite lettingTaiwan go.
　　这个设想有较大合理性，疑问仅在于：美国总统会在缺乏紧急动员国内应付危机的能力时为了台湾和中国开战吗？如果美国要放弃台湾，那它必须向中国以及日本、韩国和美国公民阐明，台湾和亚洲其他区域有着本质区别。虽然美国放弃了台湾，但美国仍将继续保护亚洲其它盟友免受霸权统治。
&&&&更多精彩军事资讯，请点击华声军事首页：
----------------------------------------------我一直在思考一个问题
这个世界到底是谁在管
张友人？释迦牟尼？穆罕默德？耶和华？
回复时间： 12:48
　　Failureto do so credibly would transform capitulation on Taiwan into the end of U.S.military hegemony in Asia. It would represent a reversal of the victories inthe Pacific during World War II. It would put much of the world&s economicpower within China&s sphere of control, not only its sphere of influence. To bethe regional hegemon in Asia would mean dominating more than half the world&spopulation and more than half its economy. Even without increasing its positionin Europe, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America -- and without achievingmilitary parity -- China could nonetheless be on a par with the United Statesin terms of global influence.
　　如果无法确保上述这点，那在台湾问题上的妥协将会是美国在亚洲军事霸权的终结，就像二战时期太平洋战争那样是局势大扭转。这将导致世界经济权力落入中国之手，且不局限于其影响范围区域。亚洲区域的霸主意味着世界半数人口和半数以上的经济的统治者。即使它在欧洲、中东、非洲或拉丁美洲的地位没有任何提升，也没有能和美国匹敌的军事实力，中国也将在全球影响力上和美国平起平坐。
　　Thatmoment of imagination may already have arrived: Although U.S. defense expertsmight think otherwise, many close watchers of U.S. domestic policy can conceiveof a compromise on Taiwan that would restore Chinese sovereignty over theisland. The future is now. For the United States to concede Asia to China&sdomination would entail stepping down from being the world&s sole superpower tobeing one of two competing superpowers. But notice what this means. The onlyway the United States can credibly commit itself to the protection of its Asianallies is for the United States to remain committed to sole superpower status.China, for its part, need only grow its military capacity to the point where itwould be big enough not to have to use it.
　　想象可能已经成为事实，虽然美国国防专家持不同意见，但很多美国国内政策研究者已经在考虑台湾重回中国统治之下的可能。从现在就可预知未来，美国将亚洲统治权拱手让给中国的话，美国就不得不放弃世界唯一超级大国的地位，并接受竞争两强中的一极的地位。但这其中意味重大，美国能够向其亚洲盟友确保保护责任的唯一保证是美国的世界唯一超级大国地位。对中国来说，它所要做的就是增强自身军事能力，最终有足够威慑能力即可。
　　Militaryrise takes place over decades, not months. Too fast a buildup of Chinesecapabilities would spook Washington and encourage hawks. Complete secrecy withregard to such a major buildup would be impossible, especially in an age ofself-appointed blogger-spies. The Chinese Communist Party has done a good jobof convincing China&s public that the country&s rise must proceed slowly, witheconomic growth first. It helps that the party is not subjected to theelectoral cycles of democratic governments, with the limited time horizon thatsuch a structure imposes.
　　军事实力的提升是长期的而不是一蹴而就的。中国军事实力的过快提升会让美国担忧并刺激鹰派人物。但这种大规模的提升想要完全保密是不可能的，特别是在充斥着自愿爆料的博客间谍的时代。中共成功地让民众相信，随着经济的快速发展，国家实力会缓慢提升。这有助于中共避免陷入民主政府那种竞选周期的羁绊，因任期有限而束手束脚。
　　Nevertheless,as most Chinese seem to realize, Beijing&s long-term geopolitical interest liesin removing the United States from the position of sole global superpower. Thereasons are both psychological and material. Like the United States, China is acontinental power with vast reach. It has a glorious imperial history,including regional dominance of what was, for China, much of the known world.In the same way that the United States is proud of democracy and its globalspread, China has its own rich civilizational ideal, Confucianism. During theyears of China&s ascendance, the cultures of Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam-- sometimes called the Sinosphere -- were deeply influenced by Chinese ideas.And Confucianism still plays a meaningful part in the thinking of at least 1.7billion people. The Chinese public is deeply nationalist, which matters to China&sunelected political leadership as much as U.S. nationalism does to Americanpoliticians. As China becomes the world&s largest economy, there is meaningfulpublic pressure for its power status to advance in parallel. Any alternativewould be humiliating. And as all Chinese know, the country has suffered itsfair share of humiliation in the last two centuries.
　　大多数中国人都明白，中国的长期利益在于挑战美国的世界唯一超级大国地位，这既有实际的也有心理的依据。和美国一样，中国是个疆域宽广的大陆强国，中国有着辉煌的历史，统治了当时中国所知的整个世界现金中的绝大部分区域。美国对它的民主制度和全球影响力感到自豪，中国也有自己引以为傲的辉煌的文明理念儒家思想。在中国的历史鼎盛时期，台湾、日本、韩国和越南这些被称之为汉文化圈的地区深受中国的影响。直到今天儒教思想仍深刻影响着至少17亿人的思维方式。中国的民众极富爱国主义情怀，这对中国非选举产生的政治领导层意义重大，不逊于美国的爱国主义对美国政治家的影响。随着中国逐渐成长为世界最大经济体，普通民众对国家地位有相应提高的呼声不容小视。任何其它选择都是耻辱，所有中国人都明白，在过去的2个世纪里中国已经蒙受了太多的羞辱。
　　Thisdoes not mean making Japan or South Korea into part of China. It does meaneventually replacing the existing regional security system that is designed tocontain and balance it. The increasingly belligerent conflicts over smallislands in the East China and South China seas are products of this emergingtrend. In some cases, the islands are strategically important in and ofthemselves, but more often they represent the nationalist impulses of thecompeting states involved. Beijing&s assertiveness signals that it thinks itshould be deferred to because of its new status, while its neighbors&aggressive responses signal that they are unwilling for China to dominatewithout pushback.
　　这不是说要把日本或者韩国并入中国。它的最终目的是要改变试图遏制和对冲它的力量的现存区域安全机制。在中国东海、南海日渐凸显的针对小岛的争端正是这一趋势的体现。在某些情况下，这些岛屿对他们有重要战略意义，但是更多的时候这只是他们的民族主义情绪的流露。中国的强硬是基于这样的心理：依照它的新地位，其它国家应该表示臣服；而邻国的强硬回应则表明，他们目前并不愿意接受中国的统治。
　　LeeKuan Yew, the former Singaporean leader who has been a mentor to every majorChinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, was recently asked whether China&s leadersintend to displace the United States as Asia&s preeminent power. &Ofcourse,& Lee replied. &Their reawakened sense of destiny is anoverpowering force.& Indeed, Lee explained bluntly, &It is China&sintention to be the greatest power in the world.&
　　自邓小平起所有中国领导人的精神导师，前新加坡总理李光耀最近被问到，中国领导人是否想要取代美国在亚洲的统治地位。“当然”，李回答道，“命运觉醒这种感觉是强大的力量”。事实上李更直白地补充道，“中国就是想要成为世界最强”。
　　Thereis plenty of hard evidence to support this interpretation. China&s defensebudget has grown more than 10 percent annually for several years, risingofficially to $116 billion in the most recent published reports, with actualdefense spending likely as high as $180 billion. In just the past couple ofyears, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier (a refitted Soviet model),announced plans to build several more, and openly tested several stealthaircraft and drones. In 2012, Communist Party-controlled media acknowledgedmore ambitious plans to develop ballistic missiles that would carry multiplewarheads -- and therefore be able to get around the U.S. missile defense shield.China is also working on submarine--launched missiles that would avoid U.S.early-warning systems left over from the Cold War. And it&s building up itsspace program on both the civilian and military sides.
　　有足够的证据说明这点。多年以来中国的国防预算保持两位数的增长，最近的公开报道显示已经攀升到1160亿美元，实际可能有1800亿左右。两年前中国第一艘航母开始服役（翻修的苏联航母），据称有计划要建造多艘，中国还公开进行隐形战机和无人机的测试。2012年中共控制的媒体公开披露，携带多弹头―能突破美国导弹防御体系―的弹道导弹等更多雄心勃勃的计划。中国还在发展能躲过美国冷战后留下的早期预警体系侦察的潜射导弹，并同时发展军民两用的太空项目。
　　Cyberwar,a fast-developing new front in global conflict, is another facet of China&seffort to change its power relationship with the United States. Cyberattacksare not what makes the Cool War &cool,& as some
have suggested. As a strategic matter, they do not differfundamentally from older tools of espionage and sabotage. But cyberattacks arejust now an especially fruitful method from the Chinese perspective becausethey do not (yet) involve traditional military mobilization and they exploit adimension in which U.S. and Chinese power are more symmetrical. Cyberattacksinvolve a certain amount of deniability, as efforts can be made to mask theorigin of attacks, making attribution difficult. They may have a significanteconomic upside, especially if they involve theft of intellectual property fromU.S. firms. Moreover, cyberwar takes place largely in secret, unknown to thegeneral public on both sides. Best of all for China, the rules for cyberwar arestill very much in flux. Regular cyberattacks are therefore likely to be anongoing facet of a Cool War, even if they are not definitional.
　　另一个全球冲突的前沿网络战，是中国积极参与和美权力斗争游戏的新领域。网络袭击并不会像外交政策网站某些专题作者认为的那样，使得凉战“缓和”。从战略角度来说，网络战和老式的间谍及阴谋破坏行为并没有本质区别。从中国角度来考虑，网络攻击是一种卓有成效的办法。因为他们不需要（暂时）进行大规模战争动员，而且这是美中实力对比中差距相对不明显的。网络攻击包括掩饰手段，比如竭力隐瞒攻击源头的地址，使得具体地点的定位更加复杂等。如果他们能够成功窃取美国企业的知识产权的话，攻击行为可能给它们带来巨大的经济利益。而且绝大多数网络战都是在双方公众都不了解的情况下隐秘进行。对中国更有利的是网络战的规则尚未明确，因此网络攻击成为凉战的一个战场，虽然这种战争的定义还未明确。
　　Facedwith the reality of conflict falling short of war, both sides need to cultivateallies as a component of their struggle. The Cold War&s major strategicdevelopments, from Soviet expansion to containment, from détente to RichardNixon&s opening to China, all clustered around the question of who would bealigned with whom. The Cool War, too, will involve a struggle to gain and keepallies. The meaning of alliance, however, will differ from what it meant duringearlier wars, in which trade between the different camps was severelyconstricted. In the Cool War, the primary antagonists are each other&s largesttrading partners. Each side can try to offer security and economic partnership,but cannot easily demand an exclusive relationship with potential client statesof the kind that obtained in the Cold War. Instead the goal will be to deepenconnections over time so that the targeted ally comes to see its interests asmore closely aligned with one side rather than the other. Much more than duringthe Cold War, key players may try to have it both ways. This is why manycountries attempt to negotiating free trade with one or both sides, whilekeeping security ties with the other.
　　冲突但还未到战争，因此双方斗争的其中一环是竭力拉拢盟友。冷战的主要战略变化发展，如因苏联的扩张而采取遏制战略，如缓和并最终尼克松展开对花交流等等，都是围绕着谁与谁结盟的问题展开。这里的联盟和之前几场大战的联盟含义有所区别，那些战争中敌对阵营间的经贸往来非常少。而在凉战中，最主要的竞争对手却又是互相最大贸易伙伴。双方都能进行安全和经济合作，但无法像冷战那样和特定某国发展排他性的关系。所以争夺的目标就成为与目标国深化联系，最终使其觉得与某一边的联系更为紧密。所以和冷战不同的是，重要国家往往试图和两边都保持联系。这也正是为什么许多国家和一边或者双边都进行自贸协定谈判，却又和另外一边继续安全协议。
　　ThePacific region is the first and most obvious place where the game of allianceshas begun to be played -- and it challenges the post-World War II &hub andspokes& arrangement of bilateral treaties between the United States andJapan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia that guaranteed security withoutjoining them into a single regional alliance on the model of NATO.
　　亚太地区可能是结盟运动最早也最明显的区域，这改变了二战后美国和日本、韩国、台湾及澳大利亚签署双边安全协议，不需要加入北约这种地区盟约的中心-辐射模式。
----------------------------------------------我一直在思考一个问题
这个世界到底是谁在管
张友人？释迦牟尼？穆罕默德？耶和华？
回复时间： 12:49
　　Overthe course of the last decade, China has replaced the United States as thelargest trading partner with each of these Pacific countries. Consider this: Insome fashion, the United States is now engaged in guaranteeing these countries&freedom to trade with China.
　　用了10年时间，中国取代了美国作为所有亚太国家最大贸易伙伴的地位。从某种角度来说，美国确保了这些国家和中国进行贸易的自由。
　　InNovember 2012, China joined Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand,and the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to announcenegotiations for what the group calls a Regional Comprehensive EconomicPartnership. Taken as a whole, the proposed free trade group would include apopulation of some 3 billion people with as much as $20 trillion in GDP andapproximately 40 percent of the world&s trade. It represents an alternative tothe American-proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, which would include the UnitedStates but not China. For the moment, neither is mutually exclusive, but theexclusions are significant.
　　2012年11月，中国、日本、韩国、印度、澳大利亚、新西兰和东盟十国宣布启动区域全面经济伙伴关系谈判。这个提议中的自由贸易体系覆盖了约30亿人口、20万亿美元的国民生产总值和世界贸易总额的约40%。这是取代美国发起的跨太平洋战略经济伙伴关系协议的另一选择，该协议包括美国但不包括中国。目前两者并不互斥，但鸿沟显然存在。
　　China&slong-term interest is to supplant and eventually replace the United States asthe most important regional actor. It has benefited from U.S. securityguarantees and now sees no reason why it should be hemmed in by Americanproxies. At the same time, it must be careful not to frighten Japan and SouthKorea so much that they cling to Washington&s embrace. Creating a regionaltrade alliance that included traditional U.S. regional allies but not theUnited States would serve these complicated and slightly contradictory goals.It would provide countries like Japan and South Korea with the incentive todraw closer to China while framing that movement in terms of economic advantagerather than security.
　　中国的长期目标是排挤并最终取代美国区域最重要主导力量的地位。之前它从美国的安全保障中获益，但现在它感觉没有必要被美国的代理人限制。与此同时，它需要谨慎行动以避免过度惊吓日本和韩国让它们抓住美国不放。构建一个包含美国传统盟友但不包括美国的区域贸易联盟是符合这些复杂而又略有些自相矛盾的目标的。给予向日本和韩国这样的国家靠近中国的动力，同时将这些行动限制在经济而非安全范畴内。
　　Emblematicof the Cool War&s contradictory new reality is that China is negotiating forfree trade with Japan at precisely the moment when geopolitical tensionsbetween them are at their highest point in decades. The conflict over theDiaoyu/Senkaku Islands went from civilian to military in a matter of months, asboth sides scrambled jet fighters and mobilized navies. This conflict is itselflogical: the product of uncertainty over the changing balance of power. Yet theeconomic partnership is strengthening simultaneously.
　　凉战矛盾现实的最明显体现就是，中国和日本处在一段历史时期以来地缘政治紧张高点，却又在商谈自由贸易。钓鱼岛争端数月来从民事走向军事，双方都派出了战机和海军。争端是有其自身理由的，这是改变实力平衡后不稳定局面所带来的后果。而经济合作却同时不断加强。
　　TheU.S. response to the changing geostrategic situation has been to signalincreasing willingness to empower its regional allies, particularly Japan. Theincorporation of a Japanese admiral as the second in command at last summer&sRIMPAC exercise, the world&s largest joint naval drill, was a signal that theUnited States views with favor a potential Japanese shift away from pacifism andtoward a more active regional security role. And though U.S. President BarackObama recently extended its agreement with South Korea to avoid its militarynuclearization, the option remains on the table.
　　针对地缘政治局势的改变，美国很明显地增加了增强地区盟友尤其是日本实力的意愿。环太平洋军演是世界海上最大规模联合军演，在去年的演习中日本将领担任联合部队副司令清楚地表明，美国希望日本抛弃和平主义并成为地区安全事务重要参与者。虽然奥巴马总统最近向韩国保证日本会继续军事无核化，但这仍然是美国的可选项。
　　Butthis regional response will not be enough. The United States will also have tobroaden its base of allies using the tools of ideology. The strongest argumentthat can be made to countries that trade freely with China is that Chinesehegemony would threaten their democratic freedoms. Sen. John McCain&s proposedleague of democracies -- a kind of free-form alliance of ideologically similarstates designed to leave out China and Russia -- is therefore likely to berevived eventually, though probably under another name.
　　但仍需要整体布局。美国需要凭借意识形态来扩大和盟友的共同基础。对那些和中国展开自由贸易的国家来说，最好的理由就是中国霸权可能会影响它们的人民自由权利。麦凯恩提议组建的民主国家联盟，即拥有相似意识形态的国家组成的自由形式的把中国和俄罗斯排除在外的联盟，这很有可能最终实现，不过或许会冠以另外的名字。
　　Indiais the leading candidate for membership. The originator of the Non-AlignedMovement is not in the same position as it was during the Cold War. Today,nonalignment risks letting China rise to regionally dominant status. India&sinterest is to balance China in the realm of geopolitics while urging it torespect international law, especially the laws of intellectual property andtrade. India must, of course, be careful not to push the Chinese too far. Chinacould use border troubles with India to feed domestic nationalism. But Indiacould potentially be increasingly open to joining a democratic league to helpcontain China. The natural ground for the alliance is democracy and humanrights -- the features that the United States and India share but China lacks.
　　印度是盟友的最佳人选。这个不结盟运动的创建者如今所处的位置和冷战时期不同。现在不结盟运动可能会让中国成为区域主宰国家。印度的利益在于平衡中国在地缘政治领域的力量，并同时促使它尊重国际法律尤其是知识产权和贸易相关法律。印度必须，同时谨慎地不把中国往外推得太远。中国会利用和印度的边界纠纷来抚慰国内民族主义情绪。印度加入一个民主联盟协同遏制中国的可能性在增加。这个联盟的基石是民主和人权，这是美国和印度共有而中国所欠缺的。
　　China&sgreat advantage in the race to find allies is its pragmatism. Unlike the UnitedStates, which often struggles awkwardly with its autocratic allies, Chinatypically makes no demands that its allies comply with international norms ofhuman rights or other responsible behavior. China&s natural allies are, as aresult, often bad international actors, as the examples of Iran, North Korea,and Syria make clear. Meanwhile, Beijing has an independent interest inopposing any form of humanitarian intervention or regime change based on ahuman rights justification -- hence its opposition to any justifications by theU.N. Security Council for intervention in Syria.
　　中国在争取盟友方面的最大优势是它的实用主义。和美国经常与其独裁的盟友发生可笑的争执不同，中国通常不会要求盟友遵守有关人权的国际法则或是其他负责任的行为。因此中国的天然盟友经常是国际坏小子，如伊朗、朝鲜和叙利亚。对于以人道主义理由进行任何形式人道主义干涉或是政权更迭，中国出于自身考虑常表示反对。因此它否认安理会干涉叙利亚的所有理由。
　　Soit is natural -- and so far, cost-effective -- for China to provide cover forsuch allies. Russia shares the same interests, and the once-chilly China-Russiarelationship has been considerably warmed by overlapping interests in trying tolimit Western regime change. Indeed, Russia may emerge as China&s mostimportant geostrategic ally -- a development signaled recently by Xi Jinpingmaking Russia his first foreign trip after assuming the Chinese presidency.Nothing of the kind had happened since Nixon&s opening to China created a30-year rift between the former allies. If the United States reached out toChina in the Cold War to weaken the Soviet Union, China may try to use Russiasimilarly in the Cool War. Certainly, Russia&s Vladimir Putin seems like hewould oblige.
　　目前为止，这是中国对这些盟友提供保护的本能且卓有成效的方式。俄罗斯和中国利益一致，曾经冷淡的中俄关系因为在遏制西方进行政权颠覆上的利益一致而变得热络起来。事实上俄罗斯可能是中国最重要的政治盟友，最近的标志就是习选择俄罗斯作为其当选国家主席之后外出访问的首站。在尼克松访华造成这两个前盟友之间30年的裂缝里，这样的事情从未有过。如果说冷战时期美国接近中国是为了削弱苏联，那中国也可能在凉战中依照此法来利用俄罗斯。当然，俄罗斯的普京看似愿意照做。
　　Chinahas also been highly effective in creating alliances with resource-rich Africanstates. China became Africa&s leading trading partner in 2010. China typicallyopts to work with existing governments -- whether they are autocratic does notmatter -- to build infrastructure that is sorely lacking. The Chinese touttheir own expertise
they bring Chines and they promise to deliver the benefits of improved roads, rivers, andrevenue streams for government.
　　在拉拢资源丰富的非洲国家盟友上中国也已卓有成效。2010年中国成为非洲最主要贸易伙伴。中国通常会和现政府合作修建急需的基础设施，至于是什么类型的政权无关紧要。中国极力兜售他们的快速发展经验、派遣中国劳工过去工作、承诺将改善后的道路、河流的收益以及现金收益给所在国。
　　China&spragmatic approach to Africa is free of any evangelical spirit and appeals toits interlocutors& naked self-interest -- and the Chinese make no bones aboutthe fact that they are pursuing their own self-interest as well. They makelittle or no attempt to reform African governance or African ways of life. Theymay condescend, but they do not lecture. Unlike Western interactions withAfrica, the Chinese encounter does not seem plagued by bad conscience. How muchthis will ultimately matter to Africans remains to be seen. Backlash has begunin some places, and there will no doubt be more. But a policy of pragmatichonesty may confer real advantages when dealing with countries and peoples whoare accustomed to being met with self-serving lies. China aims to get thebenefits of resource colonization without paying the international price ofbeing hated as a colonizer -- and it has a reasonable chance of succeeding.
　　中国在非洲的实用主义实践中没有任何福音精神，这符合了对象国赤裸裸的自利原则，而中国也不讳言自身的利益需求。他们并不想改变非洲的政治或者生存状况。中国可能存有优越感但并不想进行说教。这和西方与非洲的交往不同，中国并没有愧疚感。对非洲人民带来的影响仍有待观察，但在部分地区已经带来反弹且毫无疑问会越演越烈。在面对习惯于自私自利的谎言打交道的国家和人民时，实用主义政策能带来实实在在的好处。中国想要给付高于被称之为殖民制度的国际价格来获取资源殖民权，而这似乎确实能成功。
　　Extensivecooperation in economics, intense competition in geopolitics: This newsituation poses extraordinary risks. Yet economic interdependence also posesunique opportunities for the peaceful resolution of conflict. What&s more, itcreates common interests that mitigate the impulse to domination. Trade is thearea where cooperation can have the greatest transformative effects -- and thegreatest potential avenue for resolution of conflicts. Today, China is anactive participant in the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime, which is themost effective expression of international law ever created. Countries obey thedecisions of WTO tribunals out of straightforward self-interest: The cost ofdefection is outweighed by the benefits of staying in the international trade regime.This is not a route to world government, utopian or dystopian, but rather amodel of self-interested rule of law in an important economic realm.
　　经济合作加大政治竞争激烈这种新形势带来了额外的风险，不过经济上的互相依赖也给和平解决争端带来了特殊的机遇。而这也扩大了共同利益减少了殖民冲动。
　　贸易是合作能起到最大作用的领域，而且也最有可能解决争端问题。如今中国是世贸组织最主要参与国之一，而世贸组织正是国际法律作用最明显的机制。各国都遵守世贸组织公正的裁决，因为如果背弃该组织的的代价明显更高。这无法成为国际秩序的典范，太脱离实际，但无疑这是重要经济领域上的自利法治的模式。
　　Tomanage the Cool War, we must always keep in mind the tremendous gains that boththe United States and China have achieved and will continue to experience as aresult of economic cooperation. Both sides should use the leverage of theirmutually beneficial economic relationship to make fighting less attractive. Thepositive benefits of trade will not render geopolitical conflict obsolete. Butfocusing on them can help discourage a too rapid recourse to violence.
　　要控制凉战，我们必须时刻意识到，美中都从经济合作中已经取得和将继续取得的巨大收益。双方都应该利用互利的经济关系来减少斗争的可能性。贸易的正面效益不会就此杜绝政治斗争，但关注这些能够避免盲目诉诸武力。
　　Theworld is going to change under conditions of Cool War, and efforts to keep theconflict from heating up must take account of these changes. New networks ofinternational alliances are emerging. International organizations like the WTOwill have more power than before and should be deployed judiciously andcreatively. International economic law can increasingly be enforced as a resultof participants& mutual self-interest. Global corporations will have to developnew national allegiances as part of a Cool War world, but they can also provideincentives to discourage violence and associated economic losses. Human rights,long treated as a rhetorical prop in the struggle between great powers, willstill be used as a tool. But over time, respecting rights may come to be inChina&s interests, with major consequences for the enforcement of human rightseverywhere.
　　世界将因凉战发生改变，要避免争端激化就必须注意到这些改变。新型国际结盟形式已经出现。世贸组织这样的国际组织的力量比以往有所增强，而这些力量必须审慎且灵活地运用。国际经济法律会因参与方的彼此间的自利而强化落实。全球合作会发展出凉战世界中的一种新国际盟约关系，这可以有效避免暴力冲突和冲突带来的经济损失。在强权博弈中人权一直被视为是华丽的辞藻，今后也会是斗争的工具。但随着时间的推移，世界各地都提高对人权的尊重，尊重人权或许会成为中国利益的一部分。
　　Whatunifies these conclusions is a willingness to embrace persistent contradictionas a fact of our world. We must be prepared to acknowledge both diverginginterests and also areas of profound overlap. We must be forthright aboutideological distance, yet remain open to the possibility that it can graduallybe bridged. We must pay attention to the role of enduring self-interest whilealso remembering that what we believe our interest to be can change what itactually is.
　　总而言之，结论就是我们要接受矛盾冲突是世界的一部分。我们要了解利益上的分歧和一致。我们要坦率承认理念上的不同，但同时对逐渐的融合持开放心态。
　　TheUnited States and China really are opponents -- and they really do need eachother to prosper. Accepting all this requires changing some of our assumptionsabout friends and enemies, allies and competitors. It means acknowledging thatopposed forces and ideas do not always merge into a grand synthesis and thattheir struggle also need not issue in an epic battle to the finish.
　　美中是竞争对手，然而他们确实需要另一方的繁荣。要接受这点，我们必须改变某些我们有关朋友与敌人、盟友与对手的概念。即对立的力量和理念并不一定会融合成一体，或是相互间的斗争必须以一场轰轰烈烈的大战告终。
　　Itwould be uplifting to conclude that peace is logical, that rational people onall sides will avert conflict by acting sensibly. But such a conclusion simplybetrays the facts -- and possibilities -- of this tense relationship. Instead Ioffer a more modest claim: Geostrategic conflict is inevitable, but mutualeconomic interdependence can help manage that conflict and keep it fromspiraling out of control.
　　认为和平是合乎常理的，即所有理性的人都会采取合理行动避免冲突是振奋人心的。但这样的看法不符合紧张关系这一事实和可能的演变。因此我个人的观点更调和一些：地缘政治冲突不可避免，但经济上的相互依赖可以控制冲突，避免局势失控。
　　Wecannot project a winner in the Cool War. If violence can be avoided, humanwell-being improved, and human rights expanded, perhaps everybody could emergeas a winner. If, however, confrontation leads to violence, we will all lose.
　　我们无法断言说谁能在凉战中胜出。但如果能够避免战争、人类的福祉得以改善、人权得到扩大，或许所有人都是赢家。但如果冲突演变成战争，所有人都会是输家。
----------------------------------------------我一直在思考一个问题
这个世界到底是谁在管
张友人？释迦牟尼？穆罕默德？耶和华？
回复时间： 12:52
　　评论翻译:
　　Greatwrite up. One thing though, &Excessive defense spending will makethe United States less competitive economically&. Really?? Ithought it was the exact opposite.
　　Iwouldn&t worry to much about China. They&ll implode. Or they&llmodernize and democratize (in which case we don&t have to worry). Orwe&ll go to war with them, which solves that uncertainty right there. Theball is totally in their court. The rest of the world has already choseits side whether they realize it or not. And it doesn&t look good forChina. Nobody wants their culture, nobody want&s their tech, nobody wantstheir resources (except precious metals), nobody wants their friendship, nobodywants them for anything other than manufacturing, and quick money. Sure,they&re a massive emerging consumer market, but how long will educatedconsumers live with being abused by their own government ? China eithermakes real headway on reforming itself or they&re doomed. Human rights,it turns out, isn&t just some liberal annoyance that pesters a country at itsperiphery while it rises unhindered. Human rights are a serious make orbreak issue for a country. In the modern world, if China doesn&t give itscitizens their rights, if it doesn&t reform, if it doesn& then It&stoast. Wastebasket of history. Back to the drawing board for themiddle kingdom.
　　文章不错，不过关于这点“巨额军费开支将降低美国的经济竞争力”。是嘛？我认为恰好相反。
　　我不是很担心中国，它会内部出问题，不然就会现代化并民主化（这样的话我们也不需要担心了）。否则我们会和他们开战，问题一样解决。所以球在他们那边。不管意识到这点没有，世界其他各国已经选边站队，而且情况对中国不利。没人喜欢他们的文化、技术和资源（除了稀有金属）、友谊、除了工业品和热钱之外的任何东西。中国确实是一个快速发展的消费市场，但是受过良好教育的消费者能忍耐政府的苛待多久？中国要不在自身改革上有实际举动要不玩完。……。人权是国家兴衰的关键。在现代社会，如果中国不赋予公民权利不改革开放的话，它肯定完蛋，丢进历史的垃圾堆里。一切从头再来。
　　Tikitonko
　　hurricanewarning
　　Have any of the commentators looked at Singapore? They haveessentially the same system as China-single party rule. Yet nobody in the Westcriticizes their form of government which has turned out to be very durable,successfully and brought prosperity to their country.
　　你研究过新加坡吗？本质上他们是和中国一样的体制。但是西方没人批评他们的政府体制，而它已经证明稳定、成功并能给国家带来繁荣。
　　godaironin
　　Tikitonko hurricane warning
　　Singapore&s a small place that&s easy to control with awell-educated population and had built-in infrastructure and trade relationsfrom the outset. China lost all of its economic and cultural foundationsin the 1949 revolution and has been playing catch-up ever since. Even now theoften touted prosperity and well-being of the Chinese is found in just themajor cities and among a small subset of the population, while state controlson information keep us and the Chinese themselves mostly ignorant of trueconditions within the country.
　　As faras critiques of Singapore go, I got lots of them but mainly how one guybasically controls everything in a country of five million right down to howthe parking meters work.
　　新加坡是个小地方，有良好教育的国民、先进的基础设施以及和外贸关系所以很好管理。1949年革命时中国失去了经济和文化基础，一直在努力追赶。即便现在他们宣扬的繁荣和幸福生活也只存在于大城市的少部分人中，中国的信息管制让我们和中国人自己忽视了国内的真实情况。
　　至于对新加坡的批评我听说过很多，但主要都是关于一个人控制500万人口的国家小到停车收费器如何运作的问题。
　　LordHalston
　　Tikitonko hurricane warning
　　Singapore does not occupy Tibet - or claim Indonesia as its ownterritory. Ask the Dalai Lama if China is like Singapore
　　新加坡没有占领西藏，或是声称印尼是他们的国土。问问法王中国和新加坡像不像。
　　--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
　　Adjicin
　　Chinadoes aspire to rival the US as the World&s superpower, but never at the cost ofassuming the world&s burdens. China will never fight wars on behalf of otherpeople&s freedoms. China will never respond to humanitarian crises withanything more than donations. China will buy land and resources in othernations as cheaply as possible, no compunction bribing corrupt governments tosell out their own people to give China the resources those people depend on todevelop their way out of poverty.
　　Therewill not be any buy-in on the part of the Chinese government to supportseopen-handed economic partnerships that develop other nations economically orinstitutionally. China wants the world&s resources as cheaply as they can behad, and that means helping other nations to become or remain as weak and asinept as possible.
　　The CCPhas bought off the Chinese people thus far with only a few token reforms onhuman rights, on the back of the massive economic growth of the last 2 decades.If there is real popular uprising, they must crush it, because there is noinstitutional capacity within China to accomodate greater political freedomsfor its people. The financial and legal intitutions in China cannot as-yetsupport a greater economic freedoms for Chinese to participate in the globalmarketplace independently from the CCP&s scripted relationships.
　　Predictinga Chinese collapse resulting from the Chinese people rising up and demandinggreater freedoms is assuming they ar not intelligent unto themselves, and willsimply clamor for more and more of what the CCP cannot provide, but this isunlikely. The chinese people are intelligent, hard-working, and resourcefulwithout any government influences, and have been such a people since beforetheir unification under the Chin empire. The modern China is seen by mostchinese as a trade-off, where they forego some freedoms to overcome poverty andachieve a prosperous future. In that more prosperous future, they hope to seeinstitutional capacity improved upon, whereby greater freedoms can be affordedto individual people as if it were a dispensation of wealth in another form.The chinese sense their situation as a people and as a nation more stronglythan do westerners, and have a comfort with that sense of national welfare thatwesterners do not usually fully comprehend.
　　WhatChina cannot do is innovate. To advance, they must steal and copy ideas. Tomaintain a competitive position in the global economy, they must manufacture a cheaperversion of what was first crafted somewhere else, and ship it to the world atundercutting prices. They have little power to re-shape technology as thewestern economic powers do abundantly, or to reshape institutions to betterutilize and develop resources. The peaceful rise was predicated upon theassumption that the status quo in technology and institutional power in thefree world would not change appreciably. If the movements we see in the worldtoday all proceed apace: toward greater cybersecurity and greater governmenttransparency, towards more effective economic sanctions against crime andhorrible governments, and towards greater economic development throughopen-handed partnerships between developed and developing nations.... Chinawill be forced to adapt to those changes in ways that exceed the constraints ofthe CCP&s capabilities for control. Which will compel the Chinese to movebeyond communism to something that works better., or countenance a loss ofaccess to resources, and a loss of manufacturing jobs to other developingregions
　　There isa cultural shift underway towards greater individual responsibilty in China&snew middle class. It will bear fruit, but only reluctantly will these newmiddle-class take up the burden of putting actions behind their new-foundvoice. That will involve the hard work of doing one&s own thinking, somethinghardworking people everywhere seek to avoid as long as their future looksbright.
　　But thekind of change in China where people &wake up& to the realizationthat it is an extreme exploitation to pay someone a poverty wage to producecheap plastic goods so that China can rise as a nation over other impoverishednations - probably never.
　　中国确实想要挑战美国的世界超级大国地位，但不想冒着和全世界作对的风险。中国不会为他人的自由而战。除了捐款之外，中国不会对任何人道主义危机有任何表示。中国会以尽可能低的价格购买它国的土地和资源，不会因向腐败的政府行贿让他们出售他们人民赖以改善生活的资源而感到内疚。
　　中国政府不希望给其它国家优惠待遇来让他们改善经济和制度。中国希望尽可能低地收购它国资源，这意味着让其它国家变得或者维持越弱小越无能越好。
　　中国人民觉醒并要求更多的自由进而导致中国崩溃这种论调，是建立在中国人民毫无头脑并简单要求越来越多中国共产党无法提供的要求的基础上的，但这一切并不太可能。中国人民非常聪明、勤劳、智慧且不受政府影响，这样的人民之前在清王朝的大一统治下。在大多数中国人眼中，当前只不过是一种暂时的隐忍，他们放弃部分权力来克服贫困争取将来的美好生活。到那时他们希望看到机制体制改革，个人能享有更多的自由并享有福利保障机制。中国人的民族和国家概念比西方人强得多，他们对国家富强的满足感是很多西方人难以理解的。
　　中国难以做到的创新。要进步他们就必须窃密和山寨。想要保持在国际上的竞争地位，他们必须以更低廉的价格生产其他地方已经创造的东西并以低价销售。他们不能像西方国家那样创新科技或者进行机制改革以便更高效地利用资源。和平崛起是建立在自由世界的技术和体制不会改变的假设之上的。如果今天所发生的一切加快实现：网络安全和政府透明度提高；对犯罪和流氓政府的经济制裁更有成效；发达国家和发展中国家互惠关系使得经济加速发展……中国将不得不接受这些中国共产党无法管控的改变。这些会迫使中国放弃共产主义转而接受其他制度，要不他们就要接受无法获取资源或者大量制造岗位转移到发展中地区的后果。
　　对于中国新兴中产阶级来说他们的个人责任不断加重。这会有所收获，但这些新兴中产阶级在发出声音之后仍需要承担起采取行动的重任。这其中包括独立思考，而勤劳的人们在前途光明时都不愿意这么做。
　　但这种改变，即“觉醒”的人们意识到，支付低廉的薪水让工人生产廉价的产品来使中国崛起（或者永远也不可能）并凌驾其他贫困国家之上，这是一种非常恶劣的剥削。
　　--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
　　ajkmidget96
　　Someone&sgotta come up with something cooler (no pun intended) than &The CoolWar.&
　　Man,will that sound lame in the 22nd century history books.
　　有些人需要冷静下来。
　　拜托，22世纪的历史教科书上这些说道可能让人觉得可笑。
　　videmus
　　ajkmidget96
　　The Chilled War sounds like a salad dish. What else is left?(maybe The Rather Snippy When The Wind Blows But Not Snowing Yet War)
　　凉战听着像盘凉拌沙拉。还有什么措辞？（打雷不下雨的战争？）
　　ajkmidget9
　　videmus
　　I know that it doesn&t fit reality well, but&Cold War II& sounds pretty good
　　或许不是很符合现实，不过“冷战2”听起来不错。
　　jgarbuz
　　FallSky
　　WhenChina becomes a true, multi-party democracy, the world will be happy. Butcompetition is inevitable, and theoretically, capitalism welcomes it. Weare no longer a world burdened by fixed natural resources as scienceincreasingly makes alternative power and resources accessible. Resources are nolonger limited, and nuclear war makes total war a mutually unacceptablealternative to economic competition, and so only miscalculation and fear-mongeringis what makes an apocalyptic suicidal impulse still possible. But otherwise,there is no particular reason to fear China&s becoming the largest economicpower. It&s most likely inevitable. But so what? Of course China&s militarypower grows concomitantly, but again, so what? America&s future is stillbright, but the idea that &the sky is the limit& in America might nolonger be viable.
　　国际社会乐见中国成为真正的、多党制的民主国家。竞争不可避免，不过理论上来说资本主义欢迎竞争。科学的进步使得能源和资源的替代品更多，世界不再受资源有限的困扰。资源不再是有限的，而核武器使得全面战争对双方来说都是无法接受的，所以只有误判和恐慌会使得这种完全是自杀的行为有可能发生。但换个角度来看，没什么理由需要担心中国成为最大经济体，这基本上是必然会发生的。所以呢？中国的军事实力是在持续增长，但是又怎么了？美国的未来仍然光明，但是美国的那种“生存空间有限”的想法是该改一改了。
　　--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
　　1913Intel
　　Ifeverything is OK, then why is the author even writing this article? Perhaps itcould be that a lot of people are wondering about the question of war withChina. When they weren&t wondering about it before, now they are. So China&srise has changed the thinking of many people.
　　Thereare many articles on this very topic. Most conclude that saner minds willprevail, but a few suggest that war is a real possibility. When making aprediction it&s just plain safer to project the trend. One will always be rightuntil they are wrong. Being wrong means death so no one will be around to careabout the missed forecast.
　　Projectingthe trend is more or less the linear projection method. This mostly works forshort-term forecasts but will usually be wrong for long-term forecasts. Didanyone project the Arab Spring? After 20 to 30 years of relative stability -bam.
　　Insteadof wondering about a war, one should ask the following: If war were to occur,when would it be likely to happen and what would be the conditions? Predictingwar is impossible, but one can determine if one is in danger of war.
　　You knowyou are in danger of war if:
　　1. You are seeing more and more articles wondering about war.
　　2. For US, you have had 60 to 80 years of stability.
　　3. Youare disarming - think nuclear reductions and sequestration.
　　4. Youare in decline.
　　5. Yourenemies are unstable and suffer from threats of revolution.
　　6. Waris in the best interest of your enemy leaders - not the people, but theleaders.
　　Warmight not happen, but if it were to happen then right now is a pretty goodtime.The war threat comes not just from China, but Russia too. All we need is agood excuse.
　　如果太平无事的话，作者为啥要写这篇文章？也许是很多人都在想可能会和中国开战。或许之前没想过，但现在开始担忧，所以中国的崛起改变了很多人的想法。
　　这方面已经有很多文章了。很多人认为理性将占上风，但少部分人认为战争也有可能。抑制这个趋势是更可取的，事到临头人们才会意识到自己的错误。错误就意味着死亡，所以没人关注错判。
　　抑制趋势或多或少都是线性思维方式。大多数是针对短期预测但从长期来看是错误的。在20-30年的平静时期之后，有谁预料到阿拉伯之春吗？
　　与其考虑战争的可能，还不如关心这个：如果战争爆发，会是何时在何种情况下发生？战争无法预测，但可以在处于战争威胁时做出决断。
　　如果有下述情况那你就面临战阵威胁：
　　1、越来越多谈论战争的文章
　　2、对美国来说，已经有过60-80年的和平时期
　　3、放松警惕――认为核武器在削减和封存
　　4、衰退中
　　5、对手政局不稳面临国内威胁
　　6、战争是对方领导人的最佳选择――不是人民的而是领导人的
　　可能不会爆发战争，但非要有的话现在会是个好时机。战争威胁不止来自于中国也来自于俄罗斯。只差一个借口了。
　　--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------我一直在思考一个问题
这个世界到底是谁在管
张友人？释迦牟尼？穆罕默德？耶和华？
回复时间： 12:53
　　VidBeldavs
　　I findprof. Feldman&s statement astonishing &In the first decade of the 21stcentury, the major international question was the relation between Islam anddemocracy&. The US relationship with China was vastly more importantuntil GWB chose to create an issue through the mistaken invasion ofIraq. Most countries of the world were ready to join together todampen the force of global terrorism after 9-11. But, even at thattime the US-China issue should have been visible. The terribledamage create to the US position vis a vis China through the Iraq war createdthe present predicament where a &Cool war& now limitsoptions. Wiser US post 9-11 policy would have delayed the presentpredicament by a decade or more. No &pivot to Asia& would havebeen required because the US would have already been focused on that region ofthe world rather than being distracted in the Middle East. Aregional resolution of the Afghanistan failed state involving China and otherneighbor states could have also emerged if the Iraq invasion had not beenpursued.
　　Apathway out of this predicament is to eliminate some of the causal factors andto increase reasons for active collaboration. It is time for the USto think imaginately of its major past accomplishments and to build on those tobuild a stronger future for Americans, Chinese and the world as awhole. In 1961 President Kenney launched this country on amission to the Moon. In the subsequent decades we have learned thatthe Moon is the greatest mineral find in human history. Resourcesfrom the Moon and joint endeavors to open the space frontier for the benefit ofall mankind are a challenge greater than any nation alone can address. Rising to this challenge is now necessary to address other serious problem suchas energy for a world approaching a climate change tipping point. Thesolution to this challenge can be found in space. Meeting thischallenge will require an unprecedent level of collaboration, a much deeperpartnership between the US and China than exists in the predicament outlined byprofessor Feldman. If the US and China and India and Russiaand Japan and other countries do not collaborate to open space for all mankindthe innevitable consequence will be much worst than war between the US andChina. Space will be militarized with a vastly increased dangerof total destruction of civilization and of the biosphere of the planetitself.
　　我觉得费尔德曼教授“21世纪头10年，世界主要问题是伊斯兰和民主问题”这个论断很奇怪。在布什决定错误入侵伊拉克之前，美中关系一直是最重要的问题。911之后世界上大多数国家已经联合起来遏制全球恐怖主义势力，但在那时美中问题仍然是主要问题。伊拉克战争对美国和中国博弈局势造成可怕的后果，造成当前“凉战”时美国可打的牌不多。911后美国的政策应该早在10年甚至更久之前就预防出现这样的困境。“亚洲轴心”战略本不需要，因为美国应该早将注意力集中在该区域而不是放在中东地区。如果阿富汗入侵行动没有继续的话，包括中国和其他邻国在内对阿富汗失败国家的对策应该早已出台。
　　走出这个窘境需要排除那些引发因素并深化有效的合作。如今美国应该开放思维回顾过去所取得的伟大成就，在此基础上为美国、中国和世界人民创造一个更加美好的未来。1961年肯尼迪总统开启了探月工程，之后的几十年里我们发现月球有人类历史上所发现最大的矿藏资源。开发月球和外太空资源来为全人类谋福利是单个国家无法完成的挑战。我们现在正面临全球气候变化的关键点，现在启动这个计划是应对其他严重问题的出路，未来可能寄托在外太空上。要实现这个想法需要前所未有的合作，比费里德曼教授在美中困境中所列出的合作水平要更加深入。如果美国、中国、印度、俄罗斯、日本和其他国家不能达成一致共同开发外太空，那后果将比美中之间的战争更加严重。外太空将军事化，而这给全人类乃至地球生物圈带来的威胁会日益增大。
　　--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
　　Bretzky
　　Thelikelihood of a major war breaking out between the US and China within the next10 years is very low: much lower than such likelihood between the US and SovietUnion at any time in their relationship from 1947 to 1985. It&s not that therearen&t constituencies in both countries for a more robust military effort aimedat the other side, but both sides& leaders realize that even low-level militaryconflict between the two would be very disastrous for both with little to gaineven from a victorious effort. The only way that I see the US and China startingopen military conflict is via miscalculation, which rarely leads to war, letalone major war.
　　To saythat China and the US are engaged in economic conflict is to say nothing at allreally. The US is in open economic conflict with all of the world&s majoreconomic powers. The only thing unique to the US-China dynamic is that Chinaactually has the potential of gaining the upper hand on the US at some point inthe not too distant future. Currently, the best that other economic powers canhope for is a stalemate. And the rise of China as an economic threat willlikely make the US&s current rivals (and the US as well) more pliable in comingto an agreement with each other that lays out more and greater rules of theroad for the world&s economy over the coming decade. It is mostly the Chinathreat that is providing the impetus for the TTP and TTIP processes. Whetherit&s enough to overcome the many sticking points between and among thenegotiating sides remains to be seen.
　　10年内美中爆发大战的可能性极低，比年间任何时候美国和苏联爆发战争的可能性都低。不是说两国没有人想要更强大的武装来对付彼此，而是两国领导人都明白即便取胜都收益较少却对双方都损害巨大。我认为唯一能够导致美中军事冲突的原因就是误判，这个概率极低，更别说是大规模战争了。
　　说什么中美之间存在经济争端完全是废话。美国和世界所有主要经济体都存在经济争端，美中关系中特殊的一点就在于中国拥有在将来某时能占上风的可能。目前来看其它经济强国能期盼的最佳结果就是僵持局面。中国崛起成为最大经济体的威胁是最重要因素，让美国的对手（美国自己也是）在签订相关协定时立场更为灵活，而这为今后世界经济的制定打下更多准则基础。中国威胁是加快TPP和TTIP谈判签约过程的最主要因素。至于中国威胁能否压倒谈判中其他争执问题仍然有待观察。
　　--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
　　ctimur
　　Interesting,China sees a multi-polar world that China has to work with and USconsiders China wants to unseat the US as the sole superpower.
　　很有趣，中国期盼建立一个多极世界并和谐共处，而美国则认为中国想要挑战美国的世界唯一超级大国地位。
　　jgarbuz
　　ctimur
　　Itend to agree. Britain was not happy with the rise of America as a superpowerUNTIL WWI. And most Americans were not happy with the US becoming a superpowerafter WWI, and preferred isolationism, as many now do again today. But we areback in a multi-polar, multi-power world and America will, and is, having toadjust its calculus accordingly.
　　我赞同。一战前英国不愿意看到美国作为超级大国的崛起。一战后绝大多数美国人也不愿意美国成为超级大国，他们跟今天的许多人一样更倾向于孤立主义。但是今天我们处在一个多极世界里面，美国应该也必须调整自身看法。
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　　TMulhair
　　Doesanyone consider the fax that in a few decades the Chin}