Translation of Selected Passages
from the Mengzi (Mencius)
&1997 Bryan W. Van Norden
(version of October 14, 1997)
Mengzi was a Chinese philosopher of the fourth century B.C., whose influence on his intellectual tradition is roughly equivalent to the joint influence of St. Paul and Aristotle on Western thought.
Better known to English speakers by the Latinization of his name, "Mencius,"
Mengzi thought of himself as merely defending the teachings of Confucius against rival philosophical doctrines, especially the "egoism" of Yang Zhu and the universalistic consequentialism of Mozi.
However, Mengzi was actually a very original thinker, whose doctrine of the goodness of human nature went far beyond anything Confucius had said.
Long after his death, Mengzi's interpretation of Confucianism became orthodoxy, meaning that generations of Chinese intellectuals literally memorized his work.
The Mengzi is an eponymous collection of Mengzi's sayings and his debates and discussions with students, rulers and other philosophers.
For other translations of this work, and suggestions for further reading, see my "" and my "."
(Pinyin romanization unless otherwise noted)
1A1 (text with commentary by Van Norden)
1A7 (partial translation)
2A2 (partial translation)
(text with commentary by Van Norden)
6A15 (text
with commentary by Chu Hsi)
Complete Translation:
Mengzi had an audience with King Hui of Liang.
The King said, "Sir, you have
come, not regarding hundreds of miles[1] [too] far.
Surely you will have something to
profit my state?"
Mengzi said in response, "Why must Your Majesty say, 'profit'?
Let there be
benevolence and righteousness and that is all.
Your Majesty says, 'How can my state be
profited?'
The Counsellors say, 'How can my family be profited?'
The scholars and
commoners say, 'How can I be profited?'
Those above and those below mutually compete
for profit and the state is endangered.[2]
"In a case where the lord of a state of ten thousand chariots is murdered, it must be by
a family with a thousand chariots.
In a case where the lord of a state of a thousand chariots
is murdered, it must be by a family with a hundred chariots.
One thousand out of ten
thousand, or one hundred out of a thousand, cannot be considered to not be a lot.
righteousness is put behind and profit is put ahead, one will not be satisfied without
grasping [from others].
"There have never been those who were benevolent who abandoned their parents.
There have never been those who were righteous who put their lord last.[3]
Majesty simply say, 'Benevolence and righteousness, and that is all.'
Why must you say
'profit'?"
Commentary by Van Norden
It is tempting to read 1A1 as a simple condemnation of profit.
But Mengzi never says
that it is wrong or bad to profit.
He only says that one should not "say" (not "speak of" or
"mention") the word "profit."
Part of the point, surely, is that if the King emphasizes
profit in what he says (even if it is the profit of his state rather than his personal profit), this
will encourage other people to emphasize profit, and this will be unprofitable.
Neither Kongzi nor Mengzi is opposed to profit, per se.
Indeed, they both seem to
think that the Ruist Way is, in the long run, the most profitable.
As Kongzi says, "The
wise profit from ren (Analects 4:2).
What Ruists do emphasize, however,
is that the effort to aim at profit directly to take profit as your primary goal, will fail.
Again, Kongzi said, "If one acts aiming at profit, one will incur much resentment"
(Analects 4:12).
Zhu Xi is clear on this point in his commentary on 1A1, where he
cites approvingly the observation of one of the Cheng brothers:
"The noble never fails to
profit, but if one single-mindedly thinks of profit[4] there will be injury.
If there is only
benevolence and righteousness [in one's heart] then one will not seek profit but will never
fail to profit."
This observation, that aiming at profit directly is self-defeating, is familiar to Western
philosophers as "the paradox of egoism."
This is not to say that the virtuous person will
perform, in each situation, the action that maximizes profit.
As Mengzi observes, "An
intent gentleman does not forget [he may end up] a brave gentleman does not
forget [he may] lose his head" (3B1).
In other words, the possession of the Ruist virtues
makes it more likely that one will obtain other goods (such as political success).
Nontheless, the possession of the virtues may require the sacrifice of some goods in the
name of virtue.
1A1 should be compared with 6B4, in which Mengzi warns Song Keng of the dangers
of endorsing policies on the grounds of their profitability.
Literally, the texts says "1000 li."
The li is a unit of length equal to
about one third of a mile.
Most translators read the previous four sentences as a conditional:
says. . ., then the Counsellors will say. . ., and the gentlemen and commoners will say. . .,
and those above and those below. . . ."
My translation is more literal, but the sense is
clearly that the King sets an example for others, so if the King aims at profit (even if it is
the profit of his state as a whole), everyone will seek to profit either their families or
themselves, with catastrophic results.
Zhu Xi comments on the preceding two sentences:
"This means that benevolence
righteousness have never failed to be profitable, thereby clarifying the meaning of the
previous passage, 'Let there be benevolence and righteousness and that is all.'"
Literally, "if one single-mindedly takes profit as one's heart."
Introduction:
The passage begins with Mengzi having an audience with King Xuan of the state of
The King asks Mengzi to inform him about the doings of the historical figures Huan of
the state of Qi and Wen of the state of Jin.
Since Confucians are supposed to be well-
versed in history, this was a reasonable request.
But Huan and Wen were "hegemons" in
their eras.
That is, they were powerful rulers of their states who nominally protected the
King, but in fact ruled in the King's place.
Mengzi disapproves of hegemons, so he tells a
He says that there is no historical record of the affairs of Huan and Wen
because none of Kongzi's (Confucius's) disciples would talk about him.[2]
Mengzi offers to talk about being a true king.
"King" Xuan, who has assumed the title fo
king without genuine authority, and who knows perfectly well that he does not rule all of
China, as a real king would, asks,
Partial Translation:
"What must one's Virtue (de) be like so that one can become a king?"
[Mengzi] said, "One cares for the people and becomes a king.
This is something no
one can stop."
[Xuan] said, "Can one such as I care for the people?"
[Mengzi] said, "He can."
[Xuan] said, "How do you know that I can?"
[Mengzi] said, "I heard Hu He[3] say,
The King was sitting up on the pavilion.
There was an ox being led past the pavilion.
The King saw it and said, "Where is the ox going?"
Someone responded, "We are about to
consecrate a bell [with its blood]."
The King said, "Spare it.
I cannot bear its frightened
appearance, like an innocent going to the execution ground."
Someone responded, "So
should we abandon the consecrating of the bell?"
[The King] said, "How can that be
abandoned?
Exchange [the ox] for a sheep."
[Mengzi continued,] "I don't know if this happened."
[Xuan] said, "It happened."
[Mengzi] said, "This heart [i.e., feeling] is sufficient to be a king.
The commoners all
thought Your Majesty was being stingy.
[But] I knew that Your Majesty could not bear
[the frightened appearance of the ox]."
The King said, "That is so.
There really were commoners like that.
Although Qi is a
small state, how could I be stingy about one ox?
It was just that I could not bear its
frightened appearance, like an innocent going to the execution ground.
Hence, I exchanged
it for a sheep."
[Mengzi] said, "Let Your Majesty not be surprised at the commoner's taking you to
be stingy.
You took a small thing and exchanged it for a big thing.
How could they
understand it?
If Your Majesty were pained at its being innocent and going to the execution
ground, then what is there to choose between an ox and a sheep?"
The King laughed, saying, "What was this heart [i.e., feeling of mine] really?!
the case that I grudged its value and exchanged it for a sheep.
[But] it makes sense that the
commoners would say I was stingy."
[Mengzi] said, "There is no harm.
This is just the way benevolence works.[4]
saw the ox but had not seen the sheep.
As for the relation of a nobles to birds and beasts,
they see them living, they cannot bear to see them die.
If they hear their cries, they cannot
bear to eat their flesh.
Hence, nobles keep their distance from the kitchen."
The King was pleased and said, "The Odes say, 'Another person had the
[but] I measured it.'
This describes you.
I was the one who did it.
I reflected and sought
it, but did not understand my heart.
You spoke, and in my heart there was a feeling of
compassion.[5]
In what way does this heart accord with being a king?"
[Mengzi] said, "Suppose there were someone who reported to your majesty, saying,
'My strength is sufficient to lift 500 pounds, but not sufficient to lift one feather.
eyesight is sufficient to examine the tip of an autumn hair, but I cannot see a wagon of
firewood.'
Would Your Majesty accept that?"
[Xuan] said, "No."
[Mengzi] said, "In the present case your kindness is sufficient to reach (chi)
birds and beasts, but benefits do not reach (zhi) the commoners.
Why is this case
alone different?[6]
Hence, not lifting one feather is due to not using one's strength.
seeing a wagon of firewood is due to not using one's eyesight.
The commoners not
receiving care is due to not using one's kindness.
Hence, Your Majesty's not being a
[true] king
it is not due to not being able."
[Xuan] said, "What is the difference between concrete cases of not doing and not being
[Mengzi] said, "'Pick up Mount Tai and leap over the north Sea.'
If you say, 'I
cannot,' this is truly not being able.
'Massage the stiff joints of an elderly person.'[7]
you say, 'I cannot,' this is not acting, it is not a case of not being able.
So Your Majesty's
not being a [true] king is not in the category (lei) of picking up Mount Tai and
leaping over the North Sea.
Your Majesty's not being a [true] king is in the category of
massaging the stiff joints of an elderly person.
"Treat your elders as elders,[8] and extend (ji) it to
your young ones as young ones,[9] and extend (ji) it to the young ones of
others,[10] and you can turn the whole world in the palm of your hand.
The Odes say,
'He set an example for his wife, it extended (zhi) to his brothers, and so he
controlled his family and state.'[11]
This means that he simply took this heart and applied
(jia) it to that.
Hence, if one extends (tui) one's kindness, it will be
sufficient to care for [all within] the Four Seas.
If one does not extend (tui) one's
kindness, one will lack the wherewithal to care for one's wife and children.
That in which
the ancients greatly exceeded others was no other than this.
They were simply good at
extending (tui) what they did.
In the present case your kindness is sufficient to
reach (ji) birds and beasts, but benefits do not reach (zhi) the commoners.
Why sit his case alone different?
Weight (quan), and then you will distinguish the
light and the heavy. Measure, and then you will distinguish the long and the short.
are all like this, the heart most of all.
Things are all like this, the
heart most of all. Let Your Majesty measure it."[12]
"As for great people, their words do not their actions
not have to produce any result. They simply dwell in righteousness."
See Mengzi 4B21, where Mengzi says there are historical
records of
Huan and Wen.
Presumably one of Xuan's toadies.
An alternative possible translation is, "This [i.e., exchanging the sheep for the ox] is
an artifice of benevolence," meaning that exchanging the sheep for the ox was a
commendable "trick," which both protected the king's delicate sensibilities (which would
have been injured by allowing an animal he had seen and felt sorry for to be executed)
while still performing the sacrifice (as required by ritual).
This is Zhu Xi's reading.
The meaning of the last clause is obscure. I translate according to Zhu Xi, who
says it means that because of what Mengzi had said, Xuan re-experienced the feelings of
compassion he had at the time he spared the ox.
Lau gives the more prosaic reading, ". . .
and your words struck a chord in me."
Mengzi thinks it is easier to have compassion on human beings than on animals, so
the fact that the King showed kindness to the ox shows that he is capable of showing
kindness to human beings.
Mengzi may be mis we have all had the
painful experience of encountering people who care for their pets but not for other humans.
But Mengzi holds that one's parents are the first objects of one's benevolence (7A15).
Consequently, according to Mengzi, if King Xuan showed kindness to an ox, he must
already have shown it to at least some human beings.
It is not clear exactly what this sentence means in the original Chinese, but it is clear
that it is an example of an easy act.
Legge translates it, ". . . breaking off a branch from a
tree at the order of a superior."
Sc., should be treated.
Sc., should be treated.
An alternative possible translation is, 'Treat your elders as elders [should be
treated] so that it extends to the elders of others," etc.
Nivison has noted in conversation with me that this ode illustrates a different sort
of "extension" than Mengzi has previously discussed in 1A7.
The ode describes the royal
Virtue, which radiates out from a sage king, transforming his subjects.
Previously in 1A7,
however, Mengzi has been discussing the extension of virtuous emotional and behavioral
reactions from one circumstance to another.
See Lau, beginning with the third paragraph on p. 57, for the continuation of the
discussion between Mengzi and King Xuan.
Partial Translation
[1]Gongsun Chou asked, saying, "Suppose that you, Master, were to be appointed to
the position of High Noble or Prime Minister in Qi and were able to put the Way into
practice there.[2]
If it were so, it would not be surprising at all if [the ruler of Qi] were to
become Hegemon or King.
If it were like this, would it move your heart or not?[3]"
Mengzi said, "It would not.
My heart has been unmoved since I was forty."
[Gongsun Chou] said, "In that case, you, Master, have far surpassed Meng
[Mengzi] said, "This is not difficult. Gaozi had an unmoved heart before I."
[Kung-sun Chou] said, "Is there a way [to cultivate] an unmoved heart?"
[Mengzi] said, "There is.
As for Bogong You's cultivation of courage, his body
would not shrink, his eyes would not blink.
He regarded (si) the least slight form
someone like being beaten in the market place.
[Insults] he would not take off of a common
fellow coarsely clad[5] he also would not take off of a lord of ten thousand chariots.
looked upon running [a sword] through a lord of ten thousand chariots like running
through a common fellow.
He did not treat the various lords with respect.
If an insult
came his way he had to return it.
"As for Meng Shishe's cultivation of courage, he said,
I look upon defeat the same as victory.
To advance only after sizing up one's enemy,
to ponder [whether one will achieve] victory and only then join [battle], this is to be in awe
of the opposing armies.
How can I be certain of victory?
I can only be without fear.
Meng Shishe resembled Zengzi. Bogong You resembled Zixia.[6]
Now, as for the
courage of the two, I do not really know which was better.
Nonetheless, Meng Shishe
preserved something important (yue).
"Formerly, Zengzi speaking to Zixiang said, 'Are you fond of courage?
I once heard
about great courage from the Master:[7]
If I examine myself and am not upright (suo), although [I am opposed by] a
common fellow coarsely clad, would I not be in fear?
If I examine myself and am
upright, although [I am opposed by] thousands and tens of thousands, I shall go
Meng Shishe's preservation of his qi[8] was still not as good as Zengzi's
preservation of the important (yue)."
[Gongsun Chou] said, "I venture to ask whether I could hear about your unmoved
heart, Master, and Gaozi's unmoved heart?"
[Mengzi answered,] "Gaozi said, 'What you do not get from doctrines (yan),
do not seek for in the heart.
'What you do not get for the heart, do not seek for in the qi,' is
acceptable.
'What you do not get from the doctrines, do not seek for in the heart,' is
unacceptable.
"The intention (zhi) is the commander of the qi.
Qi is that
which fills up the body. When the intention arrives somewhere, qi sets up camp
(ci) there.
Hence, it is said, 'Take hold of the intention.
Do not injure the
[Gongsun Chou asked,] "Since you have already said, 'When the intention arrives
somewhere, qi sets up camp there,' why do you add, 'Take hold of the intention.
Do not injure the qi'?"
[Mengzi said], "When the intention is unified it moves the qi.
qi is unified it moves the intention.
Now, stumbling and running have to do with
the qi, but nonetheless they move one's heart."
[Gongsun Chou said,] "I venture to ask wherein you excel, Master."
[Mengzi said], "I understand words (zhi yan).
I am good at cultivating my
floodlike qi."
[Gongsun Chou said,] "I venture to ask what is meant by floodlike qi."
[Mengzi said,] "It is difficult to put into words (yan).
It is a qi that is
supremely great and supremely unyielding.
If one cultivates it with uprightness
(zhi) and does not harm it, it will fill up the space between Heaven and earth.
qi that unites righteousness with the Way.[10]
Without these, it starves.
produced by accumulated righteousness.
It cannot be obtained by a seizure of
righteousness.
If some of one's actions leave one's heart unsatisfied (bu qie), it
will starve.[11]
Consequently, I say that Kao Tzu never understood (zhi)
righteousness, because he regarded it as external.[12]
"One must work at it, but do not aim at it directly.[13]
Let the heart not forget, but do
not help it grow.
Be not like the man from Song.
Among the Song there was one who,
concerned lest his corn not grow, pulled on them.
Wearily [14], he returned home, and
said to his family, "Today I am worn out.
I helped the corn to grow."
His son rushed out
and looked at them.
The corn was withered.
Those in the world who do not help the corn
to grow are few.
Those who abandon them, thinking it will not help, are those who do not
weed their corn.
Those who help them grow are those who pull on the corn.
does this not help, but it even harms them."
[Gongsun Chou said,] "What is meant by understanding words (zhi
yan)?"[15]
[Mengzi said,] "If someone's expressions (ci) are one-sided, I know
(zhi) that by which they are deluded (bi).[16]
If someone's expressions
are excessive, I know that by which they are entangled.
If someone's expressions are
heretical, I know that by which they are separated [from the Way].
If someone's
expressions are evasive, I know that by which they are exhausted.[17]
[When these
states] grow in the heart, they harm government.
When they are manifested in
government, the heart, they harm government.
When they are manifested in government,
they harm affairs.
When sages arise again, they will surely follow my doctrines
(yan)."[18]
Jeffrey K. Reigel's "Reflections on an Unmoved Mind:
An Analysis of
2A2" (Journal of the American Academy of Religion Thematic
Issue 47:3 (September 1980), pp. 434-457) is an important study of this text.
however, those familiar with Riegel's article will note that I differ with him on many
This is not a moot point.
Mencius was, in fact, soon made High noble of Qi.
On moving one's heart, see 6B15
Nothing is known about Meng Ben.
I borrow this wonderful phrase from D.C. Lau's translation.
One point to keep in mind here is that Mencius's teacher was either Zisi or a
disciple of Zisi, and Zisi (in addition to being Kongzi's grandson) was a disciple of Zengzi.
So Mencius is the spiritual line of descent from Zengzi. Zixia founded a competing Ruist
The two individuals represent two extremes with in the Ruist movement.
Zengzi was
apparently not intellectually acute (Analects 11:18), but he seemed to have a strong
emotional commitment to the Way (Analects 8:3, 4, 7).
Zixia was cleaver
(Analects 3:8) and learned (Analects 11:2), but he was accused of
emphasizing insignificant details over matters of substance (Analects 19:12), and
Kongzi found it necessary to warn him, "Be a noble scholar.
Do not be a petty scholar."
(Analects 6:13)
Bogong You is similar to Zixia, then, in that both emphasize
something superficial.
Zixia overemphasizes popularly "courageous" behavior. Meng
Shishe, in contrast, is similar to Zengzi in recognizing that real virtue has to do no just with
how one acts but with one's emotional state.
As Mengzi goes on to explain, though,
Zengzi's courage is, ultimately, superior to both the "courage" of Bogong You and that of
Meng Shishe, because he recognizes that real courage requires, not fearlessness, but the
wisdom to know what is, and what is not, to be feared.
By "the Master" he means Kongzi.
What follows may be intended as a direct
quotation from Kongzi, but it may also be Zengzi paraphrasing the Master's teaching.
Qi was originally the mist that arose from heated sacrificial offerings.
it came to refer to mist generally (clouds, etc.) and breath. More esoterically, qi
thought of as a kind of fluid, found both in the atmosphere and the human body,
responsible for the intensity of one's emotions.
For other uses in the Mencius see 6A8 and
Note that Zhuangzi inverts Mengzi's advice in Ren jian shi,
recommending that we rely upon our qi for guidance, as opposed to our
zhi (intention) or heart.
Compare A.C. Graham's translation (p. 68):
"Unify your
attention (zhi).
Rather than listen with the ear, listen with the heart.
Rather than
listen with the heart, listen with the energies (qi).
This is a difficult line to translate.
Lau translates as I do.
What does it mean,
though, to unite righteousness and the Way?
Presumably, the floodlike qi unites
one's own sense (or sprout) of righteousness and the Way (for surely righteousness in the
abstract never fails to be united with the Way).
Legge's interpretation is also defensible,
"It is the mate and assistant of righteousness and" the Way.
Perhaps both
readings are intended.
It makes a great difference whether one renders bu qie as "unsatisfied" or
"dissatisfied."
Is the point that one's heart has a positive distaste for certain actions, or
merely that the heart is apathetic toward certain actions?
On the externality of righteousness, see 6A4-5.
The second part of this sentence has several plausible interpretations.
Yang Bojun's notes especially helpful (Mengzi yizhu (Beijing:
Zhonghua shuju,
Lau suggests that we amend the text, resulting in, ". . . and never let it out of
your mind."
Legge (who claims to be following Zhu Xi) gives, ". . . but without the
object of thereby nourishing the" qi.
I think 7B33 also sheds light on this
Zhu Xi (whom Lau apparently follows) glosses the phrase I have rendered
"wearily" as, with "an unknowing expression" on his face.
In Analects 20:3 (Lau 20:3), Kongzi is reported to have said, "If one
does not understand words (yan), one will be unable to understand others."
Graham quotes a definition of ci from the Lushi chunqiu in his
Later Mohist Logic, p. 207:
"The wording [ci] is the externalization of the
idea [yi]."
The notion that people can be deluded (bi) by seeing only part
of the Way also appears in the Analects (17:7) and becomes a central notion in
Xunzi's thought (chapter 21, Jie bi)
Less likely:
"If someone's expressions are excessive, I understand the respect in
which they are entangled.
If someone's expressions are heretical, I understand the respect
in which they have departed [from the Way].
If someone's expressions are evasive, I
understand the respect in which they are exhausted."
For the continuation of this passage, see D.C. Lau's Mencius, beginning
with the last paragraph on p. 78.
Complete Translation
Mengzi said, "Humans all have hearts that will not bear [the suffering of] others.
former Kings[1] had hearts that would not bear [the suffering of] others, so they had
governments that would not bear [the suffering of] others.
If one puts into practice a
government that will not bear [the suffering of] others by means of a heart that will not bear
[the suffering of] others, bringing order to the whole world is in the palm of your
"The reason why I say that humans all have hearts that will not bear [the suffering of]
others is this.
Suppose someone suddenly (zha)[2] saw a child about to fall into a
everyone [in such a situation] would have a feeling [3] of alarm
and compassion -- not because one sought to get in good with the child's parents, not
because one wanted fame among their neighbors and friends, and not because one would
dislike the sound of [the child's] cries.[4]
"From this we can see that if one is without the heart of compassion, one is not a
If one is without the heart of disdain, one is not a human.
If one is without the
heart of deference, one is not a human.
If one is without the heart of approval and
disapproval, one is not a human.[5]
The heart of compassion is the sprout (duan)
of benevolence.
The heart of disdain is the sprout of righteousness.
The heart of deference
is the sprout of ritual propriety.
The heart of approval and disapproval is the sprout of
"People having these four sprouts is like their having four limbs.[6]
To have these
four sprouts but to say of oneself that one is unable [to be virtuous] is to steal from oneself.
To say that one's lord is unable [to be virtuous] is to steal from one's lord.
In general,
having these four sprouts within oneself, if one knows to fill them all out (kuo er
chong), it will be like a fire starting up, a spring breaking through!
If one can merely
fill them out (chong), they will be sufficient to care for [all within] the Four Seas.
If one only fails to fill them out, they will be insufficient to serve one's parents."
That is, the sage kings of antiquity, such as Yao and Shun.
The suddenness of the reaction is important.
It means that one does not have time
to deliberate over how saving the child might satisfy some ulterior motive.
One only has
time to react immediately, and instinctively, to the prospect of the child suffering.
Literally:
". . . would have a heart (xin) of alarm and compassion."
Alternatively:
". . . and not because one would dislike the reputation [for not caring
about a child in danger]."
Notice what Mencius does not say here.
He does not claim that
one would actually act to save the child.
Anyone who has ever "choked" in a moment of
crisis knows that spontaneous inclinations are not enough to guarantee action.
Furthermore, after the initial, spontaneous benevolent reaction, there may be time for
impulses to come into play.
These last three sentences seem like non-sequiturs.
Surely, the most the child-at-
the-well example shows is that all humans have the heart of compassion.
though, Mencius holds a version of the "unity of the virtues" doctrine.
Many philosophers
(including Socrates) have held that one cannot have any one of the virtues without having
the others, because they are conceptually or causally related to one another.
detailed discussion of the relationship among his cardinal virtues is in 4A27.
But, as Mencius surely knows, some humans do not have all four limbs.
hinting that there are, likewise, the "moral disabled"?
Complete Translation
The Mohist Yi Zhi sought to see Mengzi through [the help of] Xu Bi.
Mengzi said, "I
am definitely willing to see him.
Today I am still ill.
When my illness improves, I will go
and see him.
Yi Zhi does not [have to] come [again].[1]"
The next day, he again sought to
see Mengzi.
Mengzi said, "Today I can see him.
If one is not upright, the Way will not be
I will make him upright."[2]
"I have heard that Yizi is a Mohist.
Mohists, in regulating bereavement, take frugality
as their Way.
Yizi longs to (si)
change the world [to the Mohist Way].
be that he honors [the Mohist practice], while regarding it as not right?[3]
Nonetheless,
Yizi buried his parents lavishly, so he served his parents by means of what he demeans."
Xuzi told Yizi this.
Yizi said, "As for the Way of the Ruists, the ancients [tended the
people] 'like caring for a baby.'[4]
What does this saying (yan) mean?
I take it to
mean that love is without distinctions, [but] it is bestowed beginning with one's
Xuzi told Mengzi this.
Mengzi said, "Now, does Yizi truly hold that a person's
affection (qin) for his elder brother's son is like their affection for their neighbor's
There is only [one thing that should be] gleaned from that [saying].
crawling baby is about to fall into a well, it is not the baby's fault.[5]
Furthermore, the reason [why Yizi is mistaken is that] Heaven, in producing the things
[in the world] causes them to have one root, but Yizi [gives them] two roots.[6]
"Now in the past ages, there were those who did not bury their parents.
When their
parents died, they took them and abandoned them in a ditch.
The next day they passed by
them, and foxes were eating them, bugs were sucking on them.
Sweat broke out [7] [on
the survivors'] foreheads.
They turned away and did not look.
Now, as for the sweat, it
was not for the sake of others that they sweated.
What was inside their hearts broke
through to their countenances.
So, they went home and, returning with baskets and
shovels, covered them.
If covering them was really right, then when filial sons and
benevolent people cover their parents, it must also be part of the Way."
Xuzi told Yizi this.
Yizi looked thoughtful for a moment and said, "He has taught
Zhao Qi gives this last sentence an interesting reading.
He thinks that the quotation
from Mencius ends with the previous sentence, and that this sentence should be read, "Yizi
did not come," meaning that Yizi heard that Mengzi was ill and, consequently, did not
come to talk with him that day.
Notice that, despite what Mengzi says, he never actually sees Yi Zhi.
The entire
discussion is conducted using XuBi as an intermediary.
It is possible that a "not" has
dropped out one of the earlier lines, so that it actually reads, "Today I cannot see him, [but]
This is a rhetorical question.
The assumed answer is, "Of course not!"
For the context of this quotation, see James Legge, The Chinese Classics,
The Shoo King, or The Book of historical Documents, p. 389.
As Zhu Xi explains, Mengzi takes the point of saying to be that, "The common
people unknowingly violate the laws, just as a baby unknowingly falls into a well."
other words, the common people are to be treated like babies only in the respect that, just as
a baby must be protected lest it injure itself through its own ignorance, so must good rulers
protect the people from injuring themselves through their ignorance.
Mengzi's paternalism
comes out very clearly here.
What are the "one root" and the "two roots"?
David Nivison has argued that the
two roots Yizi accepts are (1) our innate sense of benevolence, which is first directed at our
parents (7A15), and (2) a doctrine (yan) of universalization that instructs us to
extend this innate feeling so that it applies to everyone equally.
Mengzi admits that Heaven
has given as the first root, but denies that there is any other basis for ethics besides this
innate sensibility (which, if properly developed, will extend to other people, but with
lessening intensity as it extends from our parents to others).
Zhu Xi, in contrast, says that
"In the generation of people and animals, each must have its root in its father and mother
without any second [root].
This is just the natural principle (li), as Heaven has
caused things to be.
Hence, one's love is based in them and extended (tui) so that
it reaches others.
Naturally there are gradations.
Now, according to Yizi's doctrine, it is
right to look upon one's father and mother as basically no different from people in the
street. But the order of bestowing [love] still begins with them.
If this isn't two roots what
Literally, "There was sweat . . . ."
Complete Translation
Mencius said, "The core (shi) of benevolence is serving one's parents.
core of righteousness is obeying one's elder brother.
The core of wisdom is knowing
these two and not abandoning them.
The core of ritual is to regulate and adorn these
The core of music is to delight in these two.
"If one delights in them then they grow.[2]
If they grow then how can they be
If they cannot be stopped then one does not notice (zhi) one's feet
dancing to them, one's hands swaying to them."
(1) Alternatively, "to adorn these two in a regulated way."
(2) Notice that a subtle
change of topic seems to have taken place.
Mencius has been discussing the virtues of
benevolence, righteousness and wisdom. We expect him to say something about the virtue
of ritual propriety, but instead he seems to be discussing ritual practices.
Admittedly, the word for "ritual" is the same as the word for "ritual propriety," so it is
syntactically possible that he is talking about the virtue of ritual propriety, but what would it
mean for the virtue of ritual propriety to "regulate and adorn" benevolence and
righteousness?
This sentence is crucial.
Mencius thinks that one way of stimulating the growth of
the sprouts is by reflecting upon and taking delight in one's own virtuous inclinations and
This is what John Taylor has labeled "extension by exercise."
Complete Translation
Gaozi said, "[Human] nature i righteousness is like cups and
To make [human] nature benevolent and righteous is like making a willow tree into cups
and bowls."
Mengzi said, "Can you, sir, following the nature of the willow tree, make it into cups
and bowls?
You must assault and rob (zei) the willow tree, and only then can you
make it into cups and bowls.
If you must assault and rob the willow tree in order to
make it into cups and bowls, must you also assault and rob people in order to make them
benevolent and righteous?
If there is something that leads people to regard benevolence
and righteousness as misfortunes [for them], it will surely be your doctrine (yan),
will it not?
Complete TranslationGaozi said, "[Human] nature is like swirling water.
Make an opening for it on the
eastern side, then it flows east.
Make an opening for it on the western side, then it flows
Human nature's not distinguishing between good and not good is like water's not
distinguishing between eastern and western."
Mengzi said, "water surely does not distinguish between east and west.
But does it
not distinguish between upward and downward?
Human nature's being good is like
water's tending downward.
There is no human who does not [tend toward] goodness.
There is no water that does not [tend] downward.
"Now, by striking water and making it leap up, you can cause it to go past your
If you guide it by daming it, you can cause it to remain on a mountaintop.
this the nature of water?!
[No,] it is that way because of the circumstances.[1]
humans can be caused to not be good is due to their natures also being like this."
Alternative translation:
"It is that way because it was forced."
Commentary by Van Norden
In 6A1, Gaozi compared human nature to a willow tree, and benevolence and
righteousness to cups and bowls made from that tree.
Mengzi pointed out that a tree has a
nature all of its own, a course of development and growth which is natural to it.
We violate
that nature by making the tree into artifacts.
If that is to be our guiding metaphor for
describing the process of moral cultivation, then people will look upon virtue as a violation
of their natures.
Consequently, in 6A2, Gaozi switches to the simile of human nature as being like
water, which just flows wherever it is guided.
Mengzi takes Gaozi's metaphor and turns it
against him.
This is largely a rhetorical move on Mengzi's part, but there is an interesting
dilemma posed by 6A1-2.
Either humans have a nature or not.
If human's have a nature,
then any vision of ethics which recommends violating that nature will seem uncompelling.
What if there is no such thing as human nature?
As it turns out (6A4-5), Gaozi thinks
humans do have a nature, so this line of argument is not open to him.
radical critics might challenge Mengzi on this point, though.
Elsewhere, however (e.g.,
2A6, 3A5, 6A10), Mengzi addresses this concern, and tries to convince us that humans
have natural tendencies which are ignored only at one's peril.
Complete Translation
Gaozi said:
Life is what is meant by "nature."[1]
Mengzi said:
Is "life is what is meant by 'nature' " the same as "white is what is meant by 'white' "?
[Gaozi] said:
[Mengzi said:]
Is the white of white feathers the same as the white of white snow, and is the white of white snow the same as the white of white jade?[2]
[Gaozi] said:
[Mengzi said:]
Then is the nature of a dog the same as the nature of an ox, and is the nature of an ox the same as the nature of a human?[3]
What does it mean to say that "Life is what is meant by 'nature' "?
I take Gaozi to mean that the nature of something is simply the characteristics that a thing has in virtue of being alive.
Mengzi is led to ask this and the previous question because philosophers in his era were alert to the fact that the appropriate use of words is very context sensitive.
A word or phrase that is correctly used in one context may have a different use, or be inappropriate, in a different context.
(See, e.g., A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao [La Salle, IL:
Open Court, 1989], pp. 150-155.)
Consequently, Mengzi wants to make sure that Gaozi is stating an exact equivalence between "life" and "nature," so that (according to Gaozi) "nature" refers to the same characteristic in all contexts, just as "white" refers to the same characteristic in all contexts.
(In contrast, Mengzi thinks that "nature" does not function like "white," because while "white" refers to the same characteristic whether we are talking about "white feathers," "white snow" or "white jade," the "nature of X" depends on what X is.)
The logical structure of Mengzi's argument is reductio ad absurdum.
In other words, he is attempting to show that Gaozi's position has logical consequences which are patently absurd.
(Given how "nature" is used in philosophical contexts, the nature of an ox is
certainly not the same as the nature of a human.)
Complete Translation
Gongduzi said, "Gaozi says, '[Human] nature is neither good nor not good.'
say, '[Human] nature can become good, and it can become not good.'
Therefore, when
Wen and Wu arose, the people were fond of goodness.
When You and Li arose, the
people were fond of destructiveness.[1]
Some say, 'There are natures that are good, and
there are natures that are not good.'
Therefore, with Yao as ruler, there was Xiang.
the Blind Man as a father, there was Shun.[2]
And with [Tyrant] Zhou as their nephew,
and as their ruler besides, there were Viscount Qi of Wei and Prince Bi Gan.
say that [human] nature is good.
Are all those others, then, wrong?"
Mengzi said, "As for their essences, they can become good.
This is what I
mean by calling [their natures] good.
As for their becoming not good, this is not the fault
of their potential (cai).
Humans all have the heart of compassion.
Humans all
have the heart of disdain.
Humans all have the heart of respect.
Humans all have the heart
of approval and disapproval.
The heart of compassion is benevolence.
The heart of
disdain is righteousness.
The heart of respect is ritual property.
The heart of approval and
disapproval is wisdom.
Benevolence, righteousness, ritual propriety and wisdom are not
welded to us externally.
We inherently (gu) have them.
It is simply that we do not
concentrate (si) upon them.
Hence, it is said, 'Seek it and you will get it.
Abandon it and you will lose it.'
Some differ from others by two, five or countless times
-- this is because they cannot exhaust their potentials.
The Odes say,
Heaven gives birth to the teaming people.
If there is a thing, there is a norm.
It is this that is the constant people cleave to.
They are fond of this beautiful Virtue.
Kongzi said, 'The one who composed this ode understood the Way!'
Hence, if there
is a thing, there must be a norm.
It is this that is the constant people cleave to.
Hence, they
are fond of this beautiful Virtue."
You and Li were notoriously bad kings of the Western Zhou Dynasty. You had the
dubious distinction of being the last ruler of the Western Zhou.
See 5A2 for a story illustrative of the evil of Shun's brother Xiang and his father,
the so-called "Blind Man."
Complete Translation
Mencius said, "Fish is something I desire (yu); bear's paw [a Chinese
delicacy] is also something I desire.
If I cannot have both, I will forsake fish and select
bear's paw.
Life is something I righteousness is also something I desire.
cannot have both, I will forsake life and select righteousness.
Life is something I
desire, but there is something I desire more than life.
Hence, I will not do just anything to
obtain it.
Death is something I hate (wu), but there is something I hate
more than death.
Hence, there are calamities I do not avoid.
If it were the case that
someone desired nothing more than life, then what [means] that could obtain life would that
person not use?
If it were the case that someone hated nothing more than death, then what
would that person not do that would avoid calamity?
From this we can see that there are
means of obtaining life that one will not employ.
From this we can [also] see that there are
things which would avoid calamity that one will not do.
Therefore, there are things one
desires more than life and there are also things one hates more than death.
It is not the case
that only the moral person has this heart.
All humans have it.
The moral person simply
never loses it.
"A basket of food and a bowl of soup -- if one gets the if one
doesn't get them then one will die.
[But] if they're given with contempt, then [even] a
wayfarer will not accept them.
If they're trampled upon,[1] then [even] a beggar won't
take them.[2]
[However,] when it comes to [a bribe of] 10,000 bushels [of grain], then
one doesn't notice[3] ritual propriety and righteousness and accepts them.
What do 10,000
bushels add to me?
[Do I accept them] for the sake of a beautiful mansion? for the
obedience of a wife and concubines? To have poor acquaintances be indebted to me?
previous case, for the sake of one's own life one did not accept [what was offered].
current case, for the sake of one's own life one did not accept [what was offered].
current case, for the obedience of a wife and concubine one does it.
In the previous case,
for the sake of one's own life one did not accept [what was offered].
In the current case, in
order to have poor acquaintances be indebted to oneself one does it.
Is this indeed
something that one can't stop [doing]?
This is what is called losing one's fundamental
(ben) heart."
The proper translation may also be, "If they're given with a kick. . . ."
Mencius has surely overstated his case here.
Many individuals have sacrificed self-
respect in order to preserve their own lives.
However, I have also been shocked by how
much self respect even street people frequently manifest.
I have had people insist on giving
me some discarded magazines (retrieved from a garbage can) in exchange for the cup of
coffee I offered, in order to preserve the illusion that they were not accepting charity.
that is really necessary in order to make Mencius's point, in any case, is that, for any given
human being, there are some acts that she considers too shameful to perform. This
sense of shame, however vestigial, is the sprout of righteousness, and can serve as the
basis for cultivating virtue.
Literally, ". . . then one doesn't distinguish (bian). . . ."
Complete Translation
Gongduzi asked, saying, "We are the same (chun) in being humans.
some become great humans and some become petty humans.
Mengzi said, "Those who follow (ts'ung) their greater part become great
Those who follow their petty part become petty humans."
Chun means same.
Ts'ung means to follow.
The greater part means
the heart.
The smaller part means things in the category of ears and eyes.
[Gongduzi] said, "We are the same in being humans.
Why is it that some follow their
greater part and some follow their petty part?"
[Mengzi] said, "It is not the office (kuan) of the ears and eyes to concentrate
(ssu), and they are misled by things.
Things interact with things and simply lead
them along.
The office (kuan) of the heart is to concentrate (ssu).
concentrates then it will get it.
If it does not concentrate, then it will not get it.
(tz'u) is what Heaven has given us.
If one first takes one's stand (li)
what is greater, then what is lesser will not be able to snatch it away.
This is [how to]
become a great person."
Commentary by Zhu Xi
Kuan means office (szu).
The office (szu) of the ear is to
the office (szu) of the eye is to look.
Each has something that it manages
(chih), but is not capable of concentrating.
Consequently, it is misled by external
Since it is incapable of concentrating and is misled by external things, it too is
simply a thing. Hence, for external things to interact with these things and lead them along
so that they abandon [their office] is not difficult.
The heart is capable of concentrating and
taking concentrating as its office (chih).
In general, as situations arise, if the heart
takes office (chih), it gets their principle and things cannot mislead it.
If it fails to
take office (chih), then it will not get their principle and things will come along and
mislead it.
These three are all what Heaven has given me, but the heart is the greatest.
one has the wherewithal to take one's stand on it (li), then there will be no affairs
one does not concentrate upon and the desires of the eyes and ears will not be able to snatch
This is how to become a great person.
The "this" (tz'u) in "This. . . Heaven" in old editions is frequently "compare"
(pi), and in Chao Ch'i's commentary it is also glossed as "for example" (pi
Since most contemporary editions have "this" and most commentaries also have
"this," it is not clear which is correct.
But to have the word "compare" is implausible in
Hence, we follow the current editions.
Fan-jun hsin-chen says:[1]
"The vastness of Heaven and Earth,
Gazing high and low, one sees no bounds!
Between them
A tiny speck -- the human form.
The minuteness of this form,
Is like a tiny
seed in a vast granary!
But to join together Heaven, Earth and human beings
Only the mind is said [to be capable of this].
In all the past and down to the present,
Who is without this mind?
But if the mind is only a servant of the body,
Then one is no different from birds and beasts.
It is only because of the mouth, ears and eyes,
And the activity of the hands and feet,
Take advantage of moments of leisure and idleness
And trouble this mind
The Subtlety of the one mind,
Is attacked my numerous desires.
What is preserved,
Alas! is so slight!
The cultivated person preserves integrity
And remains attentive and reverent.
The Heavenly Lord is unperturbed,
And the body follows its commands."
My translation of the poem that Zhu quotes is very tentative.
Complete Translation
Mengzi said, "That which humans are capable of without studying is their good
capability.
That which they know without pondering is their good knowledge (liang
"Among babes in arms there is none that does not know to love its parents.
they grow older, there is none that does not know to respect its elder brother.
one's parents as parents[2] is benevolence. Respecting one's elders is righteousness.
There is nothing else [to do] but extend (da) these to the world."
In later thinkers such as Wang Yangming, liang zhi was adopted as a
technical term to refer to "intuitive knowledge."
I don't think liang zhi is a frozen
technical term in this passage, though.
The word chih normally has a positive
connotation (2A6, 4A27, 6A6), so I usually translate it as "wisdom."
sometimes chih refers to amoral cleverness (as in 4B26).
Consequently, in this
passage I think Mencius uses the phrase "good knowledge" (liang zhi) only to
stress that he has in mind wisdom as opposed to mere cleverness.
A similar point applies
"good ability" (liang neng).
David Nivison and P.J. Ivanhoe suggest "pure knowing" as a translation for liang zhi when the term is used by Wang Yangming, because for Wang such knowing operates unless it is not "obscured" by selfish desires.
Sc., should be treated (including having the proper feelings toward them).
Complete Translation
Mengzi said, "People all have things that they will not bear.
To extend (da)
[this reaction] to that which they will bear is benevolence.
People all have things that they
will not do.
To extend [this reaction] to that which they will do is righteousness.[1]
people can (neng) fill out (chong) the heart that does not desire to harm
others, their benevolence will be inexhaustible.
If people can fill out the heart that will not
trespass,[2] their righteousness will be inexhaustible.
If people can fill out the core
reaction (shi) of not accepting being addressed disrespectfully, there will be
nowhere they go where they do not do what is righteous.
If a scholar may not speak
(wei keyi yan) and speaks, this is flattering by speaking.
If one should speak
(keyi yan) but does not speak, this is flattering by not speaking.[4]
These are both
in the category (lei) of trespassing."
Zhu Xi comments, "Humans all have the hearts of compassion and disdain.
Hence, no one does not have things that they will not bear, and will not do.
These are the
sprouts of benevolence and righteousness."
Literally:
"If people can fill out the heart that will not bore through or jump over [a
wall, in order to steal from someone else]. . . ."
(Cf. Analects 17:10)
It is also
possible that what Mengzi has in mind is boring through or jumping over a wall is in order
to carry out an illicit assignation.
Compare 4A27 on this use of shi.
Compare Analects 15:8.
Normally, bu keyi has the sense of "may
not," and keyi seems to require the stronger sense of "should" or "ought to."
Translation
Wan Zhang asked, saying, "When in [the state of] Chen, Kongzi said,
Perhaps I should return home.
The scholars of my school are wild and hasty,
advancing and grasping, but do not forget their early [behavior].[1]
When in Chen, why did Kongzi think of (si) the wild scholars of [his home
state of] Lu?"
Mengzi said, "Kongzi [said,]
If I do not get to associate with[2] those who attain the Way,[3] then must it not be
those who are wild or squeamish?
Those who are wild advance and grasp.
Those who are
squeamish have some things which they will not do.[4]
Did Kongzi not want those who attained the Way?!
He could not be sure of getting
Hence, he thought of the next [best]."
[Wan Zhang said,] "I venture to ask what one must be like, such that one can be called
[Mengzi] said, "Those like Qin Zhang, Zeng Xi and Mu Pi are the ones Kongzi called
'wild.'"[5]
[Wan Zhang said,] "Why did he call them 'wild'?"
[Mengzi] said, "Their intentions were grand.
They said, 'The ancients!
The ancients!'
But if one calmly examines their conduct, it does not match [their intentions and words].[6]
If [Kongzi] failed to get those who are wild, he desired to get to associate with who disdain
to do what is not pure.[7]
These are the squeamish.
They are the next [best].
"Kongzi said,
The ones who pass by my door without entering my home whom I do not regret
[getting as associates] are the village worthies (xiang yuan).[8]
The village
worthies are the thieves (zei) of virtue.[9]
[Wan Zhang] said, "What must one be like, such that one can be called a village
[Mengzi said, "The village worthies are] those who say,
Why are [the intentions of the wild scholars] so grand?
Their words take no notice of
their actions, and their actions take no notice of their words.
Then they say, 'The ancients!
The ancients!'
Why are the actions [of the squeamish] so solitary and aloof?
Born in this era, we
should be for this era.
To be good is enough.[10]
Eunuch-like, pandering to their eras -- these are the village worthies."
Wan Zhang said, "If the whole village declares them worthy people, there is nowhere
they will go where they will not be worthy people.
Why did Kongzi regard them as thieves
of virtue?"
[Mengzi] said, "If you [try to] condemn them, there is noth if you
[try to] censure them, there is nothing to censure.[11]
They are in agreement with the
they are in harmony with the sordid era [in which they live].
which they dwell[12] seems to be loya that which they do seems to be
blameless and pure.
The multi they regard themselves as right.
you cannot enter into the Way of [sage kings] Yao and Shun with them.
Hence, [Kongzi]
said [they are] 'thieves of virtue.'
"Kongzi said,
I hate (wu) that which seems but is not.
I hate weeds out of fear that they will
be confused with corn.[13]
I hate cleverness out of fear that it will be confused with
righteousness.
I hate glibness out of fear that it will be confused with faithfulness.
the tunes of [the state of] Zheng out of fear that they will be confused with [real] music.
hate purple out of fear that it will be confused with crimson.[14]
I hate the village
worthies, out of fear that they will be confused with those who have virtue.
The noble simply returns to the standard (jing).[15]
If the standard is correct,
then the multitudinous people will arise.
When the multitudinous people arise, then there
will be no evil or wickedness."
Compare Analects 5:22 (Lau 5:20)
I render yu zhi as "associate with," by comparison with Analects
However, Legge renders the phrase "to whom he might communicate his
instructions," which is also possible.
I render the phrase zhong dao as "those who attain the Way."
Lau renders
it "those who follow the middle way."
The meaning is about the same, so long as the
phrase "the middle way" is properly understood.
The middle way is not the way
of mediocrity or averageness.
It is the way of acting which is perfectly appropriate to each
situation, doing and feeling neither what is excessive nor deficient for that context.
(A similar conception appears in Aristotelianism.
See J.O. Urmson, "Aristotle's Doctrine
of the Mean," in A.O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980), pp. 157-170.)
Compare Analects 13:21 (Lau 13:21).
Unfortunately, we know almost nothing about these three individuals.
there is an interesting revealing anecdote involving Zeng Xi in Analects 11:24
(LAU 11:26).
Kongzi asks four of his associates what they would choose to do if others
fully appreciated their talents.
The first three describe governmental services for which
each thinks he is fit.
When it is Zeng Xi's turn, he says that he would just like, on a spring
day, to go swimming with a group of adults and children, enjoy the breeze, and sing a few
Kongzi sighed and said, "I'm with you."
For a contemporary example of what Mengzi has in mind, think of people who are
always saying, "Down with racism!"
"Down with sexism!" or "Be tolerant!" but fail to
live up to their own slogans.
More idiomatically, ". . . who don't want to get their hands dirty."
Xiang yuan could be translated into colloquial English as "good ol' boy,"
or "goodfella."
Zhu Xi comments:
"The xiang yuan do not have understanding. . . .
Kongzi regards them as seeming to be virtuous but not being virtuous.
Hence, he regards
them as the thieves of virtue."
In connection with Zhu Xi's observation, we might cite
Mengzi 6B6.6:
"The multitude will inherently fail to understand that which the
noble does."
Compare Mengzi 7B25, in which Mengzi distinguishes five levels of
ethical development:
the good, the fine, the great, the sagacious, and the daemonic.
xiang yuan is satisfied with the lowest level.
There are at least two ways to understand these two sentences.
seems as if there is nothing to condemn or censure in the village worthies, because
they live up to the standards of the era in which they live, but the wise person recognizes
that they really do deserve to be condemned or censured.
(2) There really is nothing to
condemn or censure in the village worthies, because they do live
up to the minimal obligations society demands.
However, to "enter into the Way of Yao
and Shun" requires more than meeting one's minimal obligations.
It requires striving to be
the best person one can be.
The wild and the squeamish, for all their failings, at least
aspire to excellence.
Compare 7A33:
"If one dwells in benevolence and [acts out] of righteousness,
the duty of the great person is complete."
Note that "corn" (miao) is also used in 2A2 as a metaphor for one's
incipient, natural virtues.
Compare also the use of "sprouts" (duan) in 2A6.
In Analects 17:16 (Lau 17:18), Kongzi says, "I hate that purple usurps
crimson, I hate that the tunes of Zheng are confused with classical music, I hate that
glibness overturns states and families."
He also condemns "clever people" as "dangerous,"
and "the tunes of Zheng" as "licentious," in Analects 15:11 (Lau 15:11).
to understand Kongzi's distaste for the color purple, recall the fact that Ruists think that
even one's clothing reflects one's concern with virtue.
(Compare Analects 10:5
(Lau 10:6).)
Those who think this is shallow are invited to reflect upon what we would
think of someone who showed up for a job interview wearing cut-off jeans and a Grateful
Dead T-shirt.
See also Steven Van Zoeren, Poetry and Personality (Stanford
University Press, 1991), p. 49.
Compare Yi Mengzi, No. 23.}